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Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles Should Apply
to Disputes with Tribal Contacts
Abstract

The Supreme Court has, in recent years, developed a detailed set of rules governing whether cases with tribal
contacts should be heard in a state or tribal forum. It is therefore all the more remarkable that courts
considering such cases have devoted almost no attention to the question of which law should apply once a
forum has been chosen. Instead, courts have broadly assumed, without explicit consideration of the issue, that
the forum in which the case is brought will apply its own law. Where state courts are concerned, two problems
exist with this approach. First, the assumption that state court will apply state law and tribal courts tribal law
puts a too-high premium on the plaintiff 's initial choice of forum, leading to uncertainty and inefficiency.
Second, and more substantively, this approach gives insufficient weight to tribes' sovereign status, because it
fails to consider that tribal standards of conduct may be relevant to deciding cases with tribal contacts. This
article offers at least a partial solution to these difficulties. It argues that, under the choice-of-law principles
followed by most states, tribal law would ordinarily govern many of the cases with tribal contacts that are
heard in state court. Wider application of tribal law in state court might help to address these concerns by
reducing the jurisdictional friction between states and tribes and permitting tribal interests to be more fully
taken into account in deciding cases. Because choice-of-law doctrine is characteristically flexible, it provides
an ideal way to balance the interest of tribes, states, and litigants. Further, state-court application of tribal law
in such situations would not (as some commentators have assumed) conflict with federal law or with tribal
autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has decided a series of
cases purporting to clarify the respective roles of state and tribal
courts in adjudicating disputes that involve Indian litigants or arise in
Indian country. As a result, a detailed set of rules now governs
whether such suits must be filed in a state or tribal forum. Since the
1
foundational case of Williams v. Lee, for example, it has been clear
that a non-Indian plaintiff whose case concerns an Indian defendant
and an on-reservation transaction must file suit in tribal court. More
recently, the Supreme Court has effectively required that suits against
a non-Indian arising out of events on privately owned land generally
2
must be brought in state court. In other situations—for example, a
lawsuit that involves non-Indians, but arguably concerns core matters
of tribal sovereignty—the proper choice of forum is a more
complicated question that may turn on seemingly inconsequential
facts: whether, say, the tribe or the state had responsibility for
3
maintaining the highway on which an accident occurred, or whether
alleged spoliation of evidence occurred on or off the campus of a
4
tribal college.
The question of which court should hear cases implicating tribal
interests thus often requires a complex and technical answer. It is
therefore all the more remarkable that courts considering such cases

1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. See generally Robert D. Probasco, Indian Tribes, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 119 (2001) (explaining the jurisdictional rules applicable to
Indians and non-Indians that depend upon land ownership).
3. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997) (holding that state
court was proper forum to decide case involving accident occurring on state highway
running through tribal land).
4. See Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit found that the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
could assert jurisdiction over spoliation of evidence claim against a nonmember. Id.
at 1135. Among the factors the Ninth Circuit considered was the degree of the suit’s
“connection to Indian lands,” which in turn required it to consider where the alleged
destruction of notes from an accident investigation report occurred. Id. The college
was located on tribal lands; thus, while the record was not clear about where the
notes had been destroyed, the court nonetheless found that the college “had control
over the notes” and that their loss or destruction consequently involved “activities
conducted or controlled by a tribal entity on tribal lands.” Id.
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have devoted almost no attention to the question of which law should
5
apply once a forum has been chosen. Instead, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly suggested that the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts
6
is identical to the scope of the tribe’s legitimate regulatory interests;
similarly, state courts have often assumed that cases heard in state
7
court will necessarily be governed by state law. As a result, courts
have tended to treat the issues of which forum should hear a case and
which law should be applied to it as if they were a single question—
simply assuming, without explicit consideration of the issue, that the
8
forum in which the case is brought will apply its own law.
This assumption, to be sure, does not entirely lack foundation.
Under current jurisdictional rules, cases involving Indians and arising
9
on tribal land must generally be heard in tribal court, while cases
10
against nonmember defendants are usually restricted to state court.
Where a case arises in the state forum and involves parties who have
links to it, most choice-of-law theories would dictate that the forum
11
should apply its own law.
Further, there are historical and philosophical reasons why tribal
law and tribal courts should be closely tied together. Tribal courts
5. See Katherine C. Pearson, Departing from the Routine: Application of Tribal Law
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 695, 725 (2000) (noting that in
federal Indian law cases, courts often focus on “adjudicative authority or jurisdiction”
to resolve disputes, rather than choice-of-law issues).
6. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (“As to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”).
7. See Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Boundaries
of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 558 (1997)
(explaining that for many state courts, “the presence of substantial off-reservation
contacts automatically has a two-pronged result: the state court has adjudicatory
jurisdiction, and state law applies to the dispute”).
8. See Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499, 508 (Ariz.
1986) (holding that state-court adjudication did not infringe upon tribal selfgovernment where a supplier sued tribal housing development project surety on
performance bond); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Bd. of County, 883 P.2d 136, 142 (N.M.
1994) (holding that despite a federal statute that limited state jurisdiction over
Indian land, the state court still had jurisdiction to adjudicate preexisting interest in
land that was purchased and held by a tribe).
9. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (D.N.M. 2000)
(underscoring that a significant aspect of tribal sovereignty is that tribal courts retain
jurisdiction over matters arising on tribal land). See generally American Indian Law:
Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit Holds That Tribal Courts Lack Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Over Products Liability Suits Arising On Tribal Land, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2469
(2005) [hereinafter American Indian Law] (providing historical background on tribal
court jurisdiction).
10. See American Indian Law, supra note 9, at 2469 (“[T]he extent to which tribal
courts properly exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over suits involving non-Indian
defendants has remained an unsettled issue.”).
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971)
(providing that the parties’ domicile and place of relevant events are important
factors in determining which law to apply in both tort and contract cases).
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are often an integral part of tribal life; indeed, the federal
government has supported tribal judicial systems as a primary means
12
of fostering tribal autonomy. There may also be practical difficulties
in applying tribal law in nontribal forums. In some tribes, elders who
13
do not speak English administer tribal law; in others, the procedures
tribal courts use to resolve disputes are inextricable from substantive
14
law. Moreover, many commentators reasonably fear that state courts
will not give adequate consideration to tribal interests, and that tribes
and their members are generally better off if disputes involving tribal
15
matters are heard in tribal forums.
Yet while these arguments have some persuasive force, they fail to
add up to a conclusive justification for keeping tribal law out of state
court. To begin with, the arguments for restricting state-court
application of tribal law are built on a jurisdictional landscape that
has changed. As the Supreme Court has steadily limited tribal
jurisdiction, it is no longer possible to assume that tribal courts have
power to hear all cases involving substantial tribal contacts. Further,
even where tribal courts have jurisdiction over individual claims,
under certain circumstances state courts are more likely to have
16
jurisdiction over an entire case —making it more likely that litigants
will make the reasonable choice to bring all possible claims in state
court, rather than splitting them between state and tribal court.
As a result of these developments, many cases that concern Indian
litigants and arise in Indian country—cases that were once handled
by tribal courts—now must be brought in state court if they are to be
heard at all. In this situation, concerns about eroding tribal-court
authority are essentially moot, since the tribal court already lacks
power to hear such cases. Moreover, if the state court chooses to
apply state rather than tribal law, the already-narrowing sphere of
12. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993)
(finding that “tribal justice systems are an essential party of tribal governments” and
providing financial and other forms of assistance to tribal courts).
13. See John J. Harte, Validity of a State Court’s Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 21
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 91-92 (1997); Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1997) (describing the important cultural role of native
languages in many tribal judicial proceedings).
14. Certain tribes, for example, use a mediation process designed to repair
relationships between the parties rather than the traditional Anglo-American model
in which an ostensibly neutral arbiter designates a winner and loser. See John v.
Baker, 30 P.3d 68, 76 (Alaska 2001) (describing Northway Tribe’s “mediation-like”
dispute resolution procedures).
15. See Harte, supra note 13, at 91 (arguing that only tribal courts should
interpret tribal law, and a state court should dismiss cases involving the
interpretation of tribal law).
16. See id. at 69 (“The existence of a non-Indian in a dispute plays a significant
role in a state court’s decision to accept concurrent jurisdiction over a matter.”).
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tribal influence will only shrink further. By contrast, the application
of tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote tribal
autonomy and self-determination by providing a way in which tribal
interests can be taken into account even where tribal courts lack
17
jurisdiction over a case.
Application of choice-of-law principles in cases with tribal contacts
also has the potential to minimize many of the procedural problems
that current rules of tribal jurisdiction create. As current doctrine
stands, the Supreme Court, acting under the assumption that state
and tribal forums will each apply their own law, has devoted
considerable attention to developing rules that determine whether a
case involving tribal contacts should be heard in tribal court or state
18
court. Because the way in which these rules should apply to any
given case is often unclear, however, they can cause litigants
19
considerable uncertainty. Further, these judicially crafted rules can
often lead to illogical and inefficient results—as when, for example,
they mandate that a given plaintiff’s claim must be heard in state
court, while a defendant’s counterclaim must be heard in tribal
20
court.
Many of these problems could be avoided if the problem of
allocating cases between state and tribal authority were regarded not
merely as a forum-selection or jurisdictional problem, but also as a
choice-of-law one. Forum-selection rules tend to dictate an all-ornothing solution. Even if a case involves an equal mixture of state
and tribal contacts, it ultimately must be brought either in state court
21
or in tribal court. By contrast, choice-of-law doctrine is far more
flexible and individualized. Unlike the decision whether to allow a
claim to be heard in a particular forum, which generally must be
made at the outset, choice-of-law decisions can be made on a case-by22
case basis and in conjunction with a decision on the merits.
A
17. See id. at 91 (considering the implications of applying tribal law in state courts
given that tribal law is often unwritten).
18. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text (providing examples of rules that
determine whether jurisdiction lies in tribal or state court).
19. See Harte, supra note 13, at 102 (pointing out that the extent of the
application of the rules set by the Supreme Court in this area is still in question).
20. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997). Under these cases, if a member of a tribe asserted a claim against a
nonmember in state court, and the nonmember wished to assert a counterclaim, the
plaintiff’s claim must be heard in state court, while the defendant’s counterclaim
must be heard in tribal court. It would also be the case if a tribe member wished to
counterclaim against a nonmember who sued in state court. Williams, 358 U.S. at
217; Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
21. See generally Harte, supra note 13, at 76-98 (providing an in-depth discussion
of concurrent jurisdiction in tribal and state courts).
22. See id. at 92-95 (examining the choice-of-law provisions pertaining to tribal
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choice-of-law approach is thus both more efficient from a litigant’s
point of view and more suited to a balanced accommodation of state
and tribal interests.
Moreover, there is little evidence that encouraging state courts to
apply choice-of-law principles in the tribal context would create the
practical difficulties that commentators have sometimes feared.
Although the problems entailed in state-court interpretation of tribal
law are real, they are also easy to overstate. It is true that the law of
certain tribes may be difficult for outsiders to understand or apply.
Many other tribes, however, rely to some degree on principles of
23
Anglo-American jurisprudence familiar to state courts.
Further,
well-established mechanisms for negotiating interjurisdictional
conflicts in general are likely to be equally useful in the tribal
context; state courts can, for example, certify difficult questions of
24
tribal law to tribal courts. Finally, in cases where tribes do not wish
to have their law applied by outsiders, choice-of-law theory is flexible
enough to take such preferences into account, thus minimizing the
25
risk of undermining tribal authority.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews in turn the two
principal strands of Indian law doctrine, as reflected in Supreme
Court cases: first, cases that attempt to foster tribal autonomy;
second, cases that impose strict limits on tribal regulatory and
adjudicative power over nonmembers. Part I then outlines two
serious problems with the current state of the law: first, that the
complex and highly fact-bound set of jurisdictional rules the Court
has developed leads to uncertainty and inefficiency in choice of
forum; and second, that the Court’s decisions have given insufficient
weight to tribal interests.
Part II examines the possibility that wider application of tribal law
in state court could help to address these concerns by reducing the
jurisdictional friction between states and tribes and permitting tribal
interests to be taken into account more fully. Part II first sets forth
the argument that, under prevailing choice-of-law principles, tribal
law jurisdiction).
23. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225, 250-55 (1994) (discussing some ways in which tribal courts integrate
traditional and Anglo-American practices); see also Pat Sekaquaptewa, Evolving the
Hopi Common Law, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 762 (2000) (describing how Hopi
judges are attempting to develop Hopi law “to ensure a tight fit between Western
justice models and persisting Hopi ways”).
24. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2005) § 7.06[2], at 654 (noting
that certification is the preferable method for state courts to handle questions of
tribal law).
25. See Harte, supra note 13 (detailing the pertinent choice-of-law provisions).
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law should be applied more broadly in state court than it generally
has been. It explores the way in which choice-of-law concepts can be
adapted to the distinctive features of tribal sovereignty, and discusses
why such an approach would have advantages over the current one.
Part III discusses potential objections to the application of tribal
law by state courts: first, that it might raise due process concerns;
second, that federal Indian law might preempt it; third, that
application of tribal law will inevitably undermine tribal autonomy.
Rejecting these arguments, this Article ultimately concludes that
state-court application of tribal law will help state courts to handle
cases with tribal contacts in a way that is fairer and more
straightforward—an outcome that will ultimately work to the
advantage of both litigants and tribes.
I.

A THICKET OF RULES: TRIBAL-STATE CASE ALLOCATION UNDER
CURRENT LAW

While a detailed set of rules governs the allocation of cases between
state and tribal courts, these rules are not the product of a
comprehensive body of doctrine or statutory scheme. Instead, most of
the principles that determine whether a case should be brought in
state or tribal court are the result of judicially formulated, fact26
specific solutions to the problems presented by individual cases.
Taken as a whole, these forum-selection rules often lead, perhaps
27
unsurprisingly, to illogical or unexpected results.
The seeming chaos of the Supreme Court’s case law is in part the
product of the two central principles by which the Court has been
guided, which have often pointed in conflicting directions. On the
one hand, the Court has sought to protect tribes’ right to govern
autonomously, free from state interference. As a result, the Court has
sought to ensure that tribal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over
28
the cases that seem most likely to implicate core tribal interests. At
the same time that it has sought to protect tribal institutions,
however, the Court has also at times looked at those institutions with
suspicion. Tribal governing bodies and tribal courts are not subject
29
to the constraints of the Constitution, and perhaps in consequence,
26. See Harte, supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that choice-oflaw decisions are made on a case-by-case basis).
27. See supra note 20 (illustrating the possible results of the jurisdictional rules in
this context).
28. For an extensive discussion of the Court’s present and historical role, see
Philip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in American Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431 (2005).
29. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[T]he existence of the right
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the Court has been reluctant to allow them to assert authority over
those who are not voting, participating members of the tribe. While
30
insisting that tribes are more than “voluntary organizations,” the
Court has nonetheless sharply constrained tribes’ ability to govern
those who have not taken affirmative steps to associate themselves
31
with the tribe.
As it has sought to promote these two often-conflicting goals, the
Court has mostly sought to regulate the allocation of cases involving
tribal contacts through one primary method: by assigning a case
either to state court, where state law will presumptively apply, or to
tribal court, where it will likely be governed by tribal law. Further,
the Court has developed such procedural mandates on a case-by-case
basis, considering only rarely—if at all—how they interact as a whole.
Therefore, like the contradictory aims they are designed to serve, the
case-allocation rules the Court has developed often pull in two
directions. This Section considers these developments and their
effects.
A. Historical Background: Tribal Autonomy and Geographic
Fragmentation
Only fairly recently have procedures for allocating cases between
state and tribal court become necessary. Until the end of the
nineteenth century, tribes generally performed the task of keeping
order on their lands themselves, using both formal and informal
32
judicial processes, and state and federal courts were frequently
33
willing to recognize and enforce the judgments of tribal courts. (By
in Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee
nation shall be exercised does not render such local powers federal powers arising
from and created by the constitution of the United States.”).
30. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (“The tribes are . . . a good deal
more than private voluntary organizations, and are aptly described as unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 4th Ed. (2004), at 154
(noting the Supreme Court’s recent focus on tribe membership).
32. See Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction Over
Federal Enforcement of Federal Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 547-48 (1997) (tracing the
history of tribal judiciaries in the United States); Zuni, supra note 13, at 20
(characterizing the federal policy before 1871, as “one of respect for tribal selfgovernment and traditional forms of tribal justice”).
33. In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 102 (1855), the Supreme
Court held that District of Columbia courts could enforce a tribal court probate
order on the basis that the tribe was included in the definition of a “territory” under
the relevant federal probate statute. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 320 (2000)
(explaining that many lower courts automatically gave full faith and credit to tribal
judgments notwithstanding uncertainty as to whether recognition of tribal judgments
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contrast, only a minority of states today extend automatic or near34
automatic recognition to tribal judgments ). While federal courts
sometimes intervened to protect tribes against hostile state
35
36
governments, tribes and states had little formal interaction.
By the late nineteenth century, however, the federal government
seized upon the notion of privatizing tribal land as a means of
reducing tribes’ institutional power and helping to assimilate
37
individual Indians into Anglo-American culture.
In addition, in
38
1887 Congress enacted the General Allotment Act, which
authorized grants of reservation land to individual Indians, to be held
in trust by the federal government for a period of time before passing
39
into private ownership. Among other significant provisions, the Act
allowed any remaining reservation land to be made available to non40
Indians; in addition, it made Indian allottees subject to state law.
Around the same time, the federal government began to assume
some of the traditional functions of tribal courts, establishing Courts
of Indian Affairs that applied federal common law rather than tribal
41
law.
While allotment was applied to different reservations to varying
degrees, the substantial majority of reservation land was ultimately
was required by the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which specifically encompasses “territories”).
34. See Robert Laurence, The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary
Enforcement of Federal, State, and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1, 16-17 (1999)
(suggesting that the majority of state courts today find that the constitutional Full
Faith and Credit clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 do not command state-court
recognitions of tribal judgments, despite early precedent holding otherwise). But see
Leeds, supra note 33, at 332 (noting that New Mexico takes the opposite view, finding
that the statute’s reference to “territories” encompasses tribal lands). Overall, most
state courts grant a measure of deference to tribal judgments that falls well short of
the automatic recognition they must accord sister-state judgments under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738. COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.07[2][b], at 660-62.
35. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
36. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 6.01[2], at 501.
37. The allotment movement followed a trend that started following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883), holding
that no jurisdiction existed in federal court over a murder of one Indian by another.
Following the decision in Crow Dog, the practice of allowing tribes autonomy in
handling their legal affairs became particularly controversial. Id. In response to
public perception that tribal justice was inadequate in cases of violent crime,
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885). The Act granted
federal courts jurisdiction over a variety of serious crimes in Indian country,
including those in which the perpetrator and victim were both Indians. See CANBY,
supra note 31, at 135.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
39. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.04, at 80-81.
40. See id. (noting that the central result of the allotments was a national
reduction in the amount of Indian-held land).
41. See id. (noting that the “primary aim” of such courts was to “end Indian
culture”).
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allotted, and much of the allotted land was ultimately sold to non42
By creating a checkerboard pattern of ownership,
Indians.
allotment added an element of uncertainty to tribal jurisdiction and
strengthened the arguments of those who believed that state courts
43
and state law should have a role in Indian country.
The
checkerboard pattern thus created gave rise to lasting uncertainty
about the territorial reach of any given tribe’s power.
In recognition of the difficulties allotment had caused, federal
policy in the 1930s shifted in a radically different direction. Federal
officials began to recognize the virtues of tribal autonomy—not just
as a default state of affairs, but as a goal towards which to strive. The
44
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 returned some unallotted land to
tribal control and provided a structure by which tribes could register
45
constitutions with the federal government. Many tribes formalized
their structures of governance in written constitutions and re46
established their defunct tribal courts.
By the 1950s, however,
assimilationism had come back into vogue, this time in the form of
the policy known as “termination,” which was designed to do away
with tribes as political entities and with reservations as distinctively
47
Indian land. In many cases, tribes were dissolved, tribal lands were
sold, and individual Indians were encouraged to relocate to non48
Indian areas.
Further, in contrast to the program of allotment,
states—as opposed to the federal government—became a primary
instrument of weakening tribal political power. Thus, as part of the
assimilation process, Congress granted certain states broad
49
jurisdiction to decide disputes in Indian country. Shortly thereafter,
Congress provided a more comprehensive grant of jurisdiction in the
42. See id. § 1.04, at 79 (noting that Indian-held land declined from 138 to 48
million acres from 1887 to 1934).
43. See Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 22 AM. IND.
L. REV. 65, 74 n.31 (1997) (“[A]s non-Indians moved onto reservations, so too did
state law.”).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).
45. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.05, at 85-86 (highlighting that the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 marked a change in the government’s attitude towards
the protection of tribes).
46. See Leeds, supra note 33, at 324 (noting that tribal courts were eventually
“revitalized”); Zuni, supra note 13, at 20-21 (mentioning that after the Indian
Reorganization Act, many tribes adopted model constitutions).
47. See id. at 25-26 (explaining that the policy of termination was a radical
departure from previous policies).
48. See id. at 26-27 (asserting that large numbers of Indians relocated to urban
areas where many were unable to find employment).
49. See Robert B. Porter, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iroquois and New
York State, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 497, 520 n.129 (1990) (listing the five states originally
granted jurisdiction to decide disputes in Indian country: California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin).
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50

form of P.L. 280, which gave five states (California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, with a sixth jurisdiction—the
then-territory of Alaska—added in 1958) extensive criminal and civil
51
adjudicatory authority over reservations. (Later amendments
permitted other states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country with
tribal consent, which several states have done, although often to only
52
a limited extent ).
Like allotment, termination was ultimately recognized as a
failure—a policy that disrupted the fabric of tribal life while failing to
integrate tribe members, either economically or culturally, into non53
Indian society. Starting in the Nixon administration, the federal
government began to shift back toward autonomy-promoting
policies—an ideology that has remained more or less in place to the
54
present day.
At various points, therefore, the federal government has embraced
55
two essentially opposite goals —assimilationism and tribal
autonomy—and tribal institutions have been influenced not only by
these conflicting policies but by the way in which the federal
government has swung back and forth between them. In periods
when the federal government adopted pro-autonomy policies, it did
so in large part by encouraging the development of tribal law and
tribal institutions, including tribal courts. By contrast, the federal
government has primarily implemented assimilationist policies in two
ways—first, by disrupting the geographical integrity of Indian
50. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953); see COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.07, at
96-97; discussion infra Part III.B (examining Bryan v. Itasca Country, 426 U.S. 373
(1976), which gave the civil-jurisdiction provisions of P.L. 280 a fairly restrictive
interpretation).
51. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.06, at 95 (explaining that a few Indian
reservations within the affected states were exempted from P.L. 280’s coverage either
in the original statute or through later-added retrocession provisions).
52. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 6.04[3][a], at 544-45. Ten states acted at some
point to assume jurisdiction over Indian country, although in many cases such
jurisdiction was limited (e.g., to criminal cases only, or to certain reservations only)
and/or later found to be invalid. States that currently assert some degree of
jurisdiction under P.L. 280 include Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and
Washington. See id. at 544 n.308.
53. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 61 (acknowledging that the policy of termination
had “almost uniformly disastrous” consequences).
54. Id. at 29-31 (referring, specifically, to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968).
55. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (indicating that the approach of
the political branches can be compared to that of the Supreme Court, which has
vacillated over time between strong concern for tribal rights on the one hand, and
fears about abuses of tribal power on the other). The Court and the political
branches, however, have not always embraced the same trends at the same time. For
example, the Court decided Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), which strongly
embraces tribal autonomy, at a time when Congress was still flirting with
assimilationism. See infra.
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reservations, and second, by increasing the role of states in Indian
life. Thus these two sets of policies, designed to achieve opposite
ends, have resulted in an unintended hybrid: reservations that often
have strong tribal institutions, including courts, but that are
56
geographically fragmented, and that share regulatory power,
57
sometimes uneasily, with states.
Thus, as a result of various federal policies, tribes have some
common characteristics of other sovereigns, including, for example,
58
courts, political institutions, and sovereign immunity, while lacking
others, such as political authority within their borders that operates
irrespective of the ownership of individual parcels of land. As the
following Section argues, this particular set of characteristics has
shaped the way in which the Supreme Court has developed what I will
59
call, for lack of a better term, its jurisprudence of case allocation. In
other words, the Court has at various times treated tribes like
sovereigns; it has sought to protect tribal courts from state
interference and, in particular, to prevent states from asserting
60
jurisdiction over sensitive tribal issues. At the same time, the Court
has also refused to assume that tribes have all the usual characteristics
of sovereigns; it has, for example, held that tribal courts are not
61
courts of general jurisdiction and that—in striking contrast to state
courts—their jurisdiction is only as broad as the tribe’s underlying
62
regulatory power.

56. There are numerous reasons why tribal identity may not be as strongly
grounded in geography as other political entities. Most obviously, tribes may have
lost land they originally inhabited or that has political or cultural significance to the
tribe through treaties or forced relocations. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 18-19.
Congressional policies of allotment and termination have also played a significant
role. Id. at 23, 58-59.
57. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 185-94 (discussing extent of state regulatory
power in Indian country).
58. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998)
(reaffirming the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in a dispute over a promissory
note executed by the tribe not signed on tribal land).
59. For purposes of this Article, the term “case allocation” is designed to
encompass a few separate concepts: the question of whether a case implicating
Indian affairs should be brought in state or tribal court, the question of whether state
or tribal law should apply to such a case, and the question of which decision-maker
should determine the preceding two issues.
60. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959) (holding that non-Indians
cannot sue Indians in state court for disputes centered on the reservation); Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (reaffirming that
tribes enjoy immunity from suit even for off-reservation activities).
61. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (holding that tribal courts
cannot be courts of general jurisdiction because “a tribe’s inherent adjudicative
jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction”).
62. See id. at 357-58 (declining to address whether a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction and its legislative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants are equal).
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The distinct judicial goals of protecting tribal autonomy and
limiting tribal authority often point in different directions. The
problem is compounded by the fact that reservations themselves are
often fragmented, encompassing at least three different categories of
land: land owned by tribe members, land owned by non-Indians or
63
Indians who are not members of the tribe, and tribal trust land.
Because these various types of land are subject to varying degrees of
tribal influence and control, there is no obvious territorial marker of
tribal authority. Further, pockets of land outside Indian reservations,
including “all dependent communities within the borders of the
United States” and all allotted land with existing Indian title, also
64
qualify as “Indian country” by federal statute. Therefore, though
the geographical boundaries of the reservation may be clear, the
65
geographical reach of the tribe’s power is far less so. Thus, a largely
unintended byproduct of the aborted assimilationist program has
been to increase the gray areas in which both states and tribes can
plausibly claim jurisdiction.
B. Conflicting Rules: The Supreme Court and Case Allocation
In Indian jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court has had two faces:
first as a protector of tribal autonomy, and second as an enforcer of
limits on tribal power. Yet, in both roles, the Court has used rules
establishing which forum can or must hear a case as its primary
means of implementing policy. As the following Section argues, this
practice has often led to illogical results.
1. Williams and Wold: tribal autonomy as procedural rule
66
In the 1958 case of Williams v. Lee, the Court established a
jurisdictional principle that ensured that Indian defendants would
not be required to defend themselves against non-Indians in possibly
hostile state courts. Reversing the Arizona state courts, the Supreme
Court held that a non-Indian proprietor of a general store on the
Navajo Indian Reservation who wished to sue a Navajo couple for
67
unpaid debts was obliged to do so in tribal court.
The Court

63. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 126-27 (describing the various types of reservation
land).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948).
65. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); infra
note 167 (addressing the limitations on tribal influence and control).
66. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
67. See id. at 223 (“[T]o allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”).
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established a famous test for determining whether a given state
assertion of jurisdiction over Indian country was legitimate: “whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
68
their own laws and be ruled by them.”
69
Williams had a powerful philosophical influence on lower courts.
The Court’s succinct definition of tribal sovereignty as “the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them” is
70
perhaps the most widely quoted phrase in the Indian-law canon.
Beyond Williams’ strong defense of tribal autonomy, however, the
case can also be interpreted as setting forth two subsidiary principles.
First, although Williams’ holding was framed in terms of broad
principles of tribal sovereignty, Williams’ most immediate effect was to
establish a fairly rigid procedural rule: if a non-Indian sues an Indian
in a case arising in Indian country, that case must be heard in tribal
71
court. While, as the Court recognized, such a rule provides a great
deal of protection to tribes and tribal defendants, it also presents
certain practical difficulties. First, the rule assumes that the identities
of plaintiff and defendant remain stable in any given case. Often,
however, this will not be so. In certain cases—such as a complex
contract dispute—it may not initially be clear who is liable to whom,
and both parties may believe themselves to be aggrieved. In such
cases, which party becomes the plaintiff and which the defendant
may be determined simply by who files suit first. Similarly, someone
who is sued and then brings a counterclaim may be both plaintiff and
72
defendant in the same action.
Moreover, the rule of Williams
assumes that a tribal court will always be available to hear a dispute.
This is not always the case, not only because some tribes are too small
73
or poor to maintain judicial systems, but because a tribal court is
under no obligation to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction;
68. Id. at 219-20.
69. See, e.g., Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67 (N.M. 2003) (applying
the infringement test developed in Williams).
70. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 595 (describing this portion of the Williams
opinion as “one of the most frequently cited passages in federal Indian law”).
71. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 546-47 (“Perhaps because of the ambiguous
analytical basis of the holdings, state courts have seized upon the specific facts of
[Williams] rather than struggle to apply vague notions about the infringement of
tribal sovereignty or federal preemption to determine the limits of state court
adjudicatory power.”).
72. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986) (recognizing the problem created by
counterclaim asserted against Indian who had sued non-Indian in North Dakota
court).
73. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 67 (noting that while some tribes have welldeveloped judicial systems, others still rely on “very informal single-judge courts
operated on a part-time basis without supplementary services”).
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many tribes, for example, limit access to their courts to tribe
74
members.
A more substantive effect of Williams, however, may have been to
foster the perception that, in order for tribes to enjoy the right to “be
ruled by” their own laws, such laws must be enforced in tribal court.
Of course, on the facts of Williams itself, few would disagree that
application of Arizona law to the tribal defendants—presumably what
would have occurred had the plaintiffs been allowed to proceed in
state court—would have undermined Navajo self-rule by substituting
another sovereign’s laws as the decisional law in the case. The Court,
however, went further, suggesting that the mere “exercise of state
jurisdiction” would “undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
75
Reservation affairs.” Williams therefore firmly established the idea
that tribal adjudication, not application of tribal law, was the primary
device by which tribal sovereignty could be furthered.
More subtly, Williams may have had the effect of encouraging state
courts to think of tribal autonomy only in terms of tribal
adjudication. In other words, once a state court has satisfied itself
that an assertion of jurisdiction over a given case would comport with
Williams’ requirements—either because the defendant is non-Indian
or because substantial parts of the transaction occurred off the
reservation—it may conclude that it has done all that is necessary to
respect tribes’ rights to “make their own laws and be ruled by
76
them.”
Williams remains a landmark case for tribal autonomy and an
important guarantee of tribal rights. Yet while the principles
underlying Williams remain vital, the specific jurisdictional rule the
Court chose to implement those principles is perhaps in some ways
outdated, and its rigidity may constrain state courts in ways that are
77
not always beneficial to tribes.
74. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 577 (noting that many tribes follow a model
ordinance originally provided by the Department of the Interior, which does not
grant jurisdiction over nonmembers).
75. 358 U.S. at 223.
76. Id. at 220. As Reynolds notes, state courts often give Williams its narrowest
possible scope:
[S]tate courts typically refiuse to adjudicate disputes involving Indians or
reservation affairs only if the defendant is an Indian and if the transaction
involves no substantial off-reservation contacts. That is, state courts generally
assert jurisdiction over suits brought against a non-Indian defendant even if
the transaction arose in Indian country; similarly, many cases hold that state
court adjudication is proper in lawsuits filed against an Indian defendant if
the facts reveal substantial off-reservation contacts.
Reynolds, supra note 7, at 547.
77. In Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976), a case involving a tribe
member’s efforts to adopt a child who was also the subject of a tribal custody dispute,
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Where Williams addressed the consequences of a suit by a non78
79
and Wold II
concerned the
Indian against an Indian, Wold I
opposite situation: the degree to which state courts were obliged to
80
provide access to Indian plaintiffs suing non-Indian defendants.
Wold involved a North Dakota statute, Chapter 27-19, which provided
that “jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over
all civil claims for relief which arise on an Indian reservation upon
81
acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter.”
Chapter 27-19 further provided that, upon such acceptance, “civil
laws of this state that are of general application to private property”
82
would also apply in Indian country.
Following the passage of
Chapter 27-19, the Three Affiliated Tribes sued Wold Engineering in
state court for negligence and breach of contract in connection with
83
Wold’s construction of a water supply system on the reservation.
Wold counterclaimed for the Three Tribes’ alleged failure to make
payments. The North Dakota courts dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that when Chapter 27-19 instituted a tribal
consent requirement, it disclaimed all jurisdiction over tribal
84
actions.
the Court reinforced and extended the central principle of Williams by suggesting
that state courts lack jurisdiction against all Indian defendants, even in situations
where the plaintiff is also Indian. While the result in Fisher was an important victory
for tribal autonomy over custody matters, the Court included some potentially
troublesome language suggesting more generally that the need to allow tribal courts
to decide tribal disputes should override the preferences of individual Indians.
Responding to the argument that a bar on state-court access would be unfair to
Indian plaintiffs, the Fisher Court found that “even if a jurisdictional holding
occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has
access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to
benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of
Indian self-government.” Id. at 390-91. The Court’s reasoning is particularly
surprising given the existence of a seemingly far more plausible (and less
paternalistic) justification for the result in Fisher—that concern for the rights of
tribal defendants required that the claims asserted against them be decided in tribal
forums and/or according to tribal law.
78. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering
(“Wold I”), 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
79. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
80. See Wold I, 467 U.S. at 140 (noting that the case was “somewhat unusual in a
central respect” because “the Tribe seeks, rather than contests, state-court
jurisdiction, and the non-Indian party is in opposition”). Although it is actually
unclear how far Wold I and Wold II’s holdings extend, they have generally been
interpreted by state courts to mandate access for Indians who wish to sue nonIndians in state courts. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 553.
81. Wold II at 476 U.S. at 880 (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 27-19-01 (Supp. 1985)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 881.
84. Id. North Dakota courts had historically asserted jurisdiction over Indian
country in cases not involving Indian land interests. After P.L. 280 was passed, North
Dakota courts interpreted the law as confirming jurisdiction they already possessed.
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The Supreme Court reversed this holding, in a decision that has
been taken to hold that that state courts must remain open for
85
Indians who wish to bring suit there. The Court found that Chapter
27-19 was preempted insofar as it attempted to “disclaim pre-existing
jurisdiction over suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for which
there is no other forum” if tribes did not consent to the state’s
86
conditions.
In so holding, the court relied on the “important
backdrop” provided by “considerations of tribal sovereignty, and the
federal interests in promoting Indian self-governance and
87
autonomy,”
finding that “the state interest, as presently
implemented, is unduly burdensome on the federal and tribal
88
interests.”
The Court drew a sharp contrast between this situation and that of
Williams, finding that “tribal self-government is not impeded when a
State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other
persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising
89
in Indian country. Indeed, as the Court pointed out, Indians would
often have no judicial recourse in the absence of such state
jurisdiction, since even if plaintiffs were able to secure tribal
90
judgments they would be unable to enforce them in state court.
Thus, instead of emphasizing the importance of a tribal forum, the
Court instead focused on the displacement of tribal law. The Court
expressed skepticism about Chapter 27-19’s requirement that, in
order to gain access to state courts, tribes would have to agree that
state law would generally apply to claims by Indian plaintiffs. This
possibility, the Court found, was a “potentially severe intrusion on the
91
Indians’ ability to govern themselves according to their own laws”
that “simply [could not] be reconciled with Congress’ jealous regard
92
for Indian self-governance.”

In 1963, in accordance with amendments to P.L. 280 permitting new assumptions of
jurisdiction with tribal consent, the North Dakota legislature enacted Chapter 27-19.
85. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 553 (noting that, while the result in Wold rested
on narrow preemption grounds, state courts have interpreted the decision broadly).
86. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 883.
87. Id. at 884.
88. Id. at 888.
89. Wold I, 467 U.S. at 148-49; see Wold II, 476 U.S. at 888 (reasoning that allowing
Indians to bring claims against non-Indians in state court does not diminish tribal
sovereignty).
90. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 892. Although Chapter 27-19 granted access to tribes that
fulfilled the state’s conditions, the Court found these conditions to be “an
unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty” that would “operate to effectively bar
the Tribe from the courts.” Id. at 889.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 890.
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Wold I and II thus cast doubt on Williams’ implicit equation of
tribal-court jurisdiction with tribal independence. Instead, the Wold
cases suggest that adequate respect for tribal sovereignty hinges not
on whether a case is heard in a state or tribal forum, but whether it is
93
decided according to state or tribal law.
Indeed, through its
rejection of the state-law-mandating condition North Dakota
attempted to impose, Wold II can even be read to imply that under
some circumstances, state courts might be required to choose tribal
law.
At the same time, however, the Wold cases fail to explore the
implications of some of these more sweeping statements, neglecting
to consider the relationship between the regime they establish and
the policy in favor of tribal adjudication that Williams reflects.
Moreover, as is also arguably the case with Williams, the ringing
endorsements of tribal autonomy found in Wold I and II can
essentially be boiled down to a procedural rule: in this case, that
Indian plaintiffs must be allowed to sue non-Indian defendants in
state court.
Thus, under the everything-not-compulsory-is-forbidden regime
that Williams and Wold I and II set up, state courts may not assert
jurisdiction in situations where the defendant is an Indian and the
plaintiff non-Indian; in the reverse situation, however, they may not
decline jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, this rule places a strong
emphasis on the form of a lawsuit, creating a conundrum for courts—
and for litigants—in cases in which both parties have asserted claims
94
against the other. The Wold II Court recognized this issue but set it
aside, declining to address the problem of how counterclaims should
95
be handled.
The Court’s silence is particularly striking given that application of
tribal law under choice-of-law principles would represent one way to
reconcile Williams with Wold I and II. In both Williams and the Wold
cases, a principal threat to tribal sovereignty was that a tribe, or one
of its members, would be confronted with the possibility of having
state law applied to tribal disputes—in Williams because the state
court would likely have applied Arizona law to an on-reservation
transaction, in Wold I and II because North Dakota attempted to
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (highlighting the complexity of
tribal jurisdiction when elements such as the counterclaim and cross-claim are
introduced into litigation).
95. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 891 n.* (“The extent to which respondent’s counterclaim
may be used not only to defeat or reduce petitioner’s recovery, but also to fix the
Tribe’s affirmative liability has been the subject of some discussion in this case.”).
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condition tribal access to state courts on the promise to accept the
application of state law. By focusing exclusively on the court in which
a dispute was to be heard rather than the law to be applied, however,
the Court obscured these differences.
2. The Montana principle: tribes’ limited power over nonmembers
Even as it has affirmed tribal sovereignty in many cases, the Court
has also pursued a distinct, and sometimes opposite goal—shielding
tribal nonmembers from unfamiliar tribal courts. In the past two
decades, the Court has substantially narrowed tribes’ ability to
regulate the conduct of nonmembers and impeded the ability of
tribal courts to decide cases involving nonmembers. Under current
law, a person over whom the tribe lacks regulatory jurisdiction—a
category that includes almost all nonmembers—cannot be haled into
96
tribal court.
97
This principle, an unusual approach to adjudicative jurisdiction,
has brought into existence another complex jurisdictional inquiry in
cases involving tribal interests. In contrast to the several independent
rules that govern whether state courts may (or must) hear suits
involving tribal contacts, the existence of tribal-court jurisdiction
hinges on a test initially set forth in a single case, Montana v. United

96. The Court has not applied this reasoning to state courts and state law; that is,
while the Court sometimes has assumed that state jurisdiction over reservation
matters has the inherent potential to undermine tribal sovereignty, the Court has
never suggested that the jurisdictional reach of state courts over tribe members is
equivalent to the legislative authority states can exert on the reservation. In fact, in
Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court held precisely the opposite: that a grant of
adjudicative jurisdiction to state courts did not in itself imply the authority to
regulate on-reservation conduct. See 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (“[I]f Congress in
enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory
powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said
so.”).
97. Consider, for example, the tenuous connection that may justify haling an outof-state defendant into another state’s courts under the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23
(1957) (holding that Texas corporation’s assumption of insurance policy of a
California resident was sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in California);
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1211
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding California court had personal jurisdiction over French
nonprofit that had sent a cease-and-desist letter ordering Web service to take certain
actions in California). In such situations, the state lacks regulatory jurisdiction in the
ordinary sense of the term, but clearly possesses adjudicative jurisdiction. Joseph
William Singer takes an interesting view of the problem in Publicity Rights and the
Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 26
(1996), noting that “the question of whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a
case blurs four issues that are ordinarily separated in jurisdictional analysis of nonIndian courts”—that is, personal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, choice-of-law
analysis, and subject matter jurisdiction.
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98

States. In a holding that remains controversial, Montana set forth the
basic test for determining whether a tribe has regulatory jurisdiction
over a given matter, finding that tribes lacked such power where it
was not “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
99
internal relations.” These limits on tribal powers were subject to just
two explicit exceptions. Tribes might permissibly regulate “the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements,” and retained the power to “exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
100
of the tribe.”
Further, the Court suggested, the Tribe might
legitimately exercise power to regulate the activities of non-Indians
101
on tribal trust land or Indian-owned land.
For a long time, it remained an open question whether Montana
applied to the tribal adjudicative as well as the regulatory context. In
102
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court finally extended the Montana
principle to tribal jurisdiction, holding that “[a]s to
nonmembers, . . . a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed
its legislative jurisdiction.” Strate involved a collision between two
vehicles, one driven by the widow of a Three Affiliated Tribes
member and one driven by a non-Indian contractor doing on103
reservation landscaping work for a tribal community building. The
accident occurred on a state highway within the geographical
104
boundaries of the reservation.
The injured woman, who was not
herself a tribe member, sued the non-Indian contractor in tribal
105
court. The Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over
the case. While again emphasizing that “tribes retain considerable
control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,” the Court
nonetheless found that, in this case “[t]he right-of-way North Dakota
acquired for the State's highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch
equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non98. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. at 565-66.
101. The Court observed, seemingly with approval, that the district court had held
that “Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme d[id] not prevent the Crow Tribe
from limiting or forbidding non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by
or held in trust for the Tribe or its members.” See id. at 566-67.
102. 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
103. Id. at 442-43.
104. Id. at 443.
105. Id.
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106

Indian land.”
The Court thus rested its decision on Montana’s
“general rule” that, apart from exceptions for consensual
relationships and actions directly affecting the tribe’s political
integrity, “tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers
107
on non-Indian land within a reservation.”
Even as it clarified the law to some extent, Strate also signaled that
multiple factors would have to be taken into account in determining
whether tribal court jurisdiction existed. The facts of Strate, on their
face, pointed in more than one direction. The accident had
occurred on tribal trust land within the reservation; on the other
108
hand, the state had a right-of-way over the land.
By virtue of his
work on the reservation, the contractor-defendant had voluntarily
entered into at least a minimal relationship with the tribe;
nonetheless, the connection was not extensive enough to trigger
109
Montana’s exception for consensual relationships.
The injured
woman was not herself a tribe member, though her husband and
110
children were members. While the Court did not indicate that any
of these facts was individually dispositive, the tribe would almost
certainly have had a far stronger case for jurisdiction had all facts
pointed more definitively toward the tribe.
In Strate, the Court thus established a balance between a tribe’s
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction that is, in many ways, the
opposite the balance that exists with respect to states. In contrast to
tribal courts under the regime that Strate established, state courts
have far more extensive jurisdiction to hear disputes involving Indian
litigants than state legislatures do to regulate the conduct of tribe
111
members. More generally, the jurisdiction of state courts is broader
than, and distinct from, the realm in which state legislatures can
permissibly regulate; to take the most obvious example, an out-of106. Id. at 454.
107. Id. at 446.
108. Id. at 442-43.
109. While suggesting that the Montana “consensual relationship” exception
applied primarily to contract disputes, the Court in fact cited at least factors in
determining that the case at issue did not fall within the exception. First, the case
involved “tortious conduct” and therefore did not arise out of a contract. Id. at 457.
Second, the dispute was “distinctly non tribal in nature,” as it arose between two nonIndians involved in a “run of the mill highway accident” (brackets and quotation
marks omitted). Id. Finally, the injured woman was not a party to the subcontract
between A-1 and the tribe. Id. It is also notable that the record was unclear about
whether the contractor had been on the job at the time of the accident; the court did
not appear to regard this factor as significant. Id.
110. Id. at 443. There was a dispute as to whether Fredericks resided on the
reservation, but the Court held that her residence was “immaterial.” Id. at 443 n.2.
111. Indeed, as previously discussed, the holding of Bryan depends on this
distinction.
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state defendant may be haled into court under a long-arm statute to
answer for conduct that the state legislature could not regulate
112
In finding tribal jurisdiction to be no greater—and
directly.
possibly less extensive—than tribal regulatory power, the Court
signaled a sharply constrained view of the role of tribal courts relative
to state courts. Further, by indicating that the existence of tribal
jurisdiction would always be a multifactor, fact-based analysis, the
Court ensured that, in the large majority of cases, a litigant wishing to
bring a case in tribal court would have to subject herself to
113
considerable uncertainty.
Therefore, the effect of Strate has been not only to restrict tribal
courts’ jurisdiction over many claims that concern tribal matters, but
to ensure that a litigant will often have to endure lengthy uncertainty
before receiving a tribal court judgment that is free of jurisdictional
114
challenge. By contrast, Indians always have the option of bringing
112. See supra note 94.
113. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court purported to clarify
Strate’s holding, but may have only succeeded in further complicating the issue.
Hicks, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes living on the reservation,
sued state and tribal officers in tribal court, claiming that in the course of searching
his house, they had damaged his property and exceeded the bounds of their warrant.
(The authorities were looking for evidence that Hicks had illegally killed a California
bighorn sheep.) As an ironic result of the extensive cooperation that had occurred
between state and tribal authorities, the case presented complex issues of
overlapping state and tribal power. The state court had conditioned its search
warrant for Hicks’s property on the agreement of tribal authorities, and the state
game warden and a tribal officer ultimately conducted the search jointly. Hicks’s suit
alleged claims for trespass to land and chattels and abuse of process; he also claimed
several violations of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Phrasing the central
question narrowly, the Court found that the tribe lacked adjudicative jurisdiction
over “state officers enforcing state law.” More troublingly, however, the Court also
found that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the several federal claims Hicks
asserted under § 1983. The Court based this holding on “the restrictions inherent in
tribal court jurisdiction,” which “made it impossible that they be courts of general
jurisdiction.” Id. at 367. Hicks also complicated law of tribal jurisdiction in another
way—by casting doubt upon the factors that the Court in Strate had suggested would
be central to a determination of tribal jurisdiction. Strate had indicated that a
significant consideration in establishing the existence of tribal jurisdiction was
whether the land on which relevant events had occurred was tribal-owned trust land
or private fee land. 520 U.S. at 454 (stating that “tribes retain considerable control
over nonmember conduct on tribal land”). The Hicks Court, by contrast, found that
“[t]he ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining
whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.’” 533 U.S. at 359 (quoting Montana, 450
U.S. at 564-65).
114. This is true not only because the principles that determine whether a tribal
court has jurisdiction are difficult to apply, but because the extent of tribal court
jurisdiction is a federal issue, and defendants are required to exhaust jurisdictional
challenges in tribal court before a federal court will hear their claims. Thus, a
plaintiff who sues in tribal court may face jurisdictional challenges at all levels of the
tribal judicial system; even if jurisdiction is upheld, the defendant can continue to
pursue jurisdictional challenges in federal court. The ultimate result, if a federal
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cases against nonmembers in state court; indeed, under Wold I and II,
115
Thus, the Court’s
state courts are required to hear such cases.
decisions may be said to have limited tribal-court jurisdiction in two
ways: first, by establishing a class of claims that tribal courts are
prohibited from hearing; second, by creating another class of claims
in which a case can be made for tribal-court jurisdiction, but where
considerations of efficiency, convenience, and jurisdictional certainty
are likely to make state court the more appealing choice.
As a result of Strate, therefore, the tribe may effectively lose all say
in the outcome of many cases that have a clear relationship to tribe
members and tribal lands. The Court, however, has never explicitly
considered the tribal-sovereignty issues that are entailed in shunting
this class of cases into state rather than tribal court. Indeed, the
Court has essentially suggested that, for a tribal plaintiff, any remedy
is a good remedy—in other words, as long as the plaintiff can recover
in state court, the unavailability of a tribal forum is no great
116
injustice. Setting aside the issue of whether this is true in individual
cases—and it may not be, either because tribal law is more favorable
to plaintiffs than state law or because bringing the claim in state court
117
entails severe inconvenience —the Court’s approach is problematic
because it gives no weight to the tribe’s institutional interests in
having cases in which the tribe has a legitimate interest decided
according to tribal law.
The forum-based approach the Supreme Court has followed is thus
both cumbersome from a standpoint of judicial economy and
inadequate to serve many legitimate tribal sovereign interests. The
next section considers how the state-tribal case allocation problem
might be re-imagined, at least in part, as a choice-of-law question, and
how such an approach might better serve the needs of states, tribes,
and litigants.
court finds that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, is that the plaintiff may have to
restart the lawsuit from the beginning in state court.
115. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
expansive view of state court jurisdiction for many Indian claims).
116. In Strate, for example, the Court recognized that “those who drive carelessly
on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and
surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members.” 520 U.S. at 457-58. Nonetheless, the
Court appeared to believe that, in light of the availability of a state forum, a tribal
remedy was unnecessary. Id. at 459.
117. State court may be most obviously inconvenient simply for its physical
distance from the reservation—a burden that would not be eliminated even if the
state court were permitted to apply tribal law. Suing in state court may, however,
impose other burdens on the plaintiff—the burden of familiarizing oneself with state
law, for example—that would be reduced if the plaintiff had the option of suing on
tribal-law claims in state court.
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II. APPLYING CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT
As the preceding section has sought to establish, the forumselection rules the Supreme Court has established have generally (if
not exclusively) operated against a background assumption that both
state and tribal courts will apply forum law. In addition, the Supreme
Court has made clear that tribal courts may only exercise jurisdiction
in cases to which the tribe could apply tribal law in any case, and that
Congress does not generally intend for tribal courts to hear federal
118
causes of action.
No such barrier exists, of course, to tribal-court
application of state law, and some tribes do, in fact, apply state law—
119
for example, to fill in gaps in tribal codes. But no general principle
of federal Indian law obliges tribes to do so. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has increasingly restricted tribal-court jurisdiction to
matters concerning the internal relations of tribes, most cases
brought in tribal court are likely to involve tribe members and
concern matters occurring solely within the boundaries of the
reservation. Thus, it is normally a fair expectation that when a case is
brought in tribal court, tribal law should and will apply.
The purpose of this Section is to argue that the parallel proposition
need not prevail in state court—when matters involving Indians
appear in state court, state courts should not automatically apply state
120
law. Instead, states should treat tribes in the same manner as they
do sister states or foreign nations, consulting their usual choice-of-law
principles to determine whether tribal law should be applied.
In one sense, this is not a surprising recommendation. More than
one commentator has observed that state choice-of-law principles,
considered in the abstract, would frequently dictate the application of
121
tribal law to state-court cases.
Some state courts have, in fact,
122
experimented with applying tribal law. Other state courts, however,
118. See supra note 113 (noting the Supreme Court’s determination in Hicks that
Congress’s intent has been to limit tribal jurisdiction over federal claims to those
areas expressly provided for by Congress).
119. Pearson, supra note 5, at 718.
120. See Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated
Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation
Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979, 981 (1995), for a general argument that state and
tribal courts need not always have symmetrical obligations toward each other.
121. The leading Indian-law treatise, for example, concludes that “[a]pplication of
modern choice-of-law principles should sometimes lead state and federal courts to
apply tribal law in disputes arising in Indian country.” COHEN, supra note 24,
§ 7.06[2], at 652-54. See also CANBY, supra note 31, at 229-30; Pearson, supra note 5, at
716-19 (exploring the possibility of applying various choice-of-law theories to cases
with tribal contacts).
122. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 5, at 717 n.125 (citing examples of state-court
willingness to apply tribal law).

FLOREY

2006]

9/12/2006 3:46:27 PM

CHOOSING TRIBAL LAW

1651

have hesitated to do so for a variety of reasons. State courts have
expressed concerns that the application of tribal law by a non-Indian
123
court constitutes an infringement on tribal sovereignty; they have
also worried that the process of establishing the content of tribal law
124
on a given subject is simply too difficult.
Far more frequently,
however, state courts have, with little explanation, neglected to
engage in choice-of-law analysis at all, simply assuming that state law
125
will apply to cases involving tribes that are brought in state court.
Under current choice-of-law principles, this assumption is not
viable. Although the atypical nature of tribal sovereignty may require
some adjustments, state courts following commonly accepted choiceof-law principles should apply tribal law to many of the cases
involving tribal matters over which they have jurisdiction. Further,
such a practice would have distinct advantages, promoting tribal
interests while facilitating greater efficiency and judicial economy in
cases that cross reservation borders.
A. Modern Choice-of-Law Theories
States today subscribe to a broad diversity of choice-of-law theories,
some of which are centuries old and others of which academics have
developed only recently. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, most
states followed a similar set of relatively bright-line choice-of-law
principles. These principles tended to be grounded in geography
and territory, resting on the premise that a given cause of action
should be governed by the law of the place where relevant events
126
occurred. Under the traditional approach, for example, the validity
of a contract was governed by the law of the place of contracting,
while breach of contract was governed by the law of the place of
127
performance.
Under the principle of lex loci delicti—the law of the
place of the wrong—torts were governed by the law of the state where
128
the injury had occurred. Matters that were purely procedural were
123. See infra note 305 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of Laplante
on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and considering whether application of tribal
law in state courts infringes upon tribal sovereignty).
124. See, e.g., Warm Springs Prods. Inds. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d
740 (Or. 1986).
125. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 558.
126. See David P. Currie et al., Conflicts of Laws 6th ed. 13 (1993) (“Regardless of
their heated arguments over the theories of comity, vested rights, and local law,
adherents of the traditional learning essentially agreed on the territorial principle:
The governing substantive rule was derived from the law of the place where relevant
events had occurred.”).
127. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 332, 358 (1934).
128. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (“The place of wrong is in
the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
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nearly always governed by the law of the forum.
These clear,
precise principles—which had the advantage of being easy to apply
and the disadvantage of being rigid—were described at length in the
130
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, which appeared in 1934.
Toward the middle of the 20th century, a number of prominent
choice-of-law scholars launched a revolt against the First Restatement.
Brainerd Currie, perhaps the most famous of the academic
reformers, blasted the First Restatement’s methodology as “loaded
with escape devices,” including the device of “novel or disingenuous
characterization” described above, the device of “manipulating the
connecting factor” (i.e., emphasizing or de-emphasizing the
importance of a particular contact), and the device of declaring a
foreign state’s law to be against “local public policy” as a basis for not
131
applying the relevant law.
Ultimately, these criticisms helped to launch what has become
132
known as the “conflicts revolution,” a series of competing proposals
for choice-of-law principles to replace the First Restatement
approach. Among the more influential proposals put forth was the
method of resolving conflicts known as “interest analysis,” developed
133
and advanced by Brainerd Currie. Under Currie’s proposal, when a
party urged the application of a law other than forum law, a court was
to look to the “governmental policy expressed in [forum] law” and
determine whether the forum had an interest in having its law
134
applied. If the forum lacked any such interest and the foreign state
had an interest, foreign law would apply; in all other cases, forum law
135
would apply.
Courts would determine what constituted an
“interest” by considering whether application of the law would
136
directly advance the law’s underlying policy.
takes place.”). Thee accompanying notes clarified that, in personal injury cases, this
was “the place where the harmful force takes effect on the body.” Id. § 377. This
approach thus generally looked to the place of injury, not to the place where
negligent conduct might have occurred. The Restatement allowed for a few
exceptions, however; the standard of care, for example, was determined by the “place
of the actor’s conduct.” Id. § 380(2).
129. Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934).
130. Id.
131. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 175 (1993).
132. GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANTHOLOGY 57 (1997).
133. Currie, supra note 131, at 171-75.
134. Id. at 178.
135. Id.; see Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 98-103 (1984) (concluding that Currie’s “governmental interest
analysis amounts to little more than a complicated pretext for applying the lex fori in
all but the rarest circumstances”).
136. See id. at 101-02 (reviewing broadly how Currie’s “interest analysis”
determines what law to apply by considering whether the policy underlying forum
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Other academics pointed out flaws in Currie’s approach—in
particular, its strong bias in favor of forum law, which they believed
137
he had failed to justify adequately —and offered their own diverse
138
proposals.
Some were variations on interest analysis; William
Baxter, for example, argued that courts should resolve true conflicts
between state laws by “determin[ing] which state’s internal objective
will be least impaired by subordination [to another state’s interest] in
139
cases like the one before it.”
Others advocated wholly different
methods of resolving conflicts. Robert A. Leflar, for example,
advocated that courts choose the law that was “better,” in the sense of
“mak[ing] good socio-economic sense for the time in which the court
140
speaks” —a view opposite to that of Currie, who believed that courts
should not be in the business of making policy-based choices between
141
the laws of different states. Courts as well as academics worked out
alternatives to the traditional principles. In 1963, New York broke
forcefully with tradition by announcing that it would make choice-oflaw determinations based on the relative number of contacts the
litigants had with each competing jurisdiction and the degree of
142
interest each jurisdiction had in seeing its law applied to the case —
143
a method the court described as the “center of gravity” approach.
144
145
Other states, including California and Pennsylvania, developed
their own methods as well.

law would be advanced by its application).
137. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 135; Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and
Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
138. For a helpful overview and critique of various modern choice-of-law
methodologies, see generally Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70
B.U. L. Rev. 731 (1990).
139. William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18
(1963).
140. See R.A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966). Leflar advocated consideration of several factors,
including predictability, maintenance of interstate order, simplification of the
judicial task, and advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, in addition to
the question of which law was “better,” although he did acknowledge that the latter
factor was a “potent” one. Id.
141. Currie, supra note 131, at 176-77 (observing that weighing competing state
interests was a “political function” and not one that should be “committed to courts
in a democracy”).
142. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1963).
143. Id. at 282.
144. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320 (Cal. 1976) (applying a
version of Baxter’s “comparative impairment” analysis—i.e., the principle that “true
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest would be
more impaired if its law were not applied”).
145. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 855-56 (Pa. 1970) (considering, after
establishing that a true conflict exists, which state has the greater interest in the
application of its law).
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Because of the lack of consensus about the direction reform should
take, the 1971 Second Restatement—to the disappointment of
146
some —failed to take a strong stand among the various
methodologies, instead offering an array of choice-of-law factors from
which courts could choose, with little guidance as to which factors
should be most important.
The Second Restatement’s general approach was to instruct courts
to choose the law of the state with the “most significant relationship”
to the cause of action. That determination, however, was itself based
on a variety of factors. For example, where torts were concerned,
courts were to look to the traditional place-of-injury criterion, but
also to consider other factors: the place of conduct causing the
injury; the domicile, residence, and place of business of the parties;
147
and the place where the parties’ relationship was “centered.”
Unhelpfully, the Restatement added that “[t]hese contacts are to be
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
148
particular issue.”
To further complicate matters, the Second
Restatement was unclear about the degree to which it actually
represented a break with tradition. In several sections discussing
specific tort problems, for example, the Second Restatement
included the comment that “[t]he applicable law will usually be the
149
local law of the state where the injury occurred” —a statement that
150
echoed the First Restatement.
Perhaps as a result of the fact that the Second Restatement did not
settle clearly on any single method, states adopted diverse
approaches. Where tort law is concerned, for example, ten states
currently follow traditional First Restatement principles, about twice
that number follow the Second Restatement, and the remainder
151
follow other modern approaches. The breakdown of approaches is
similar in contracts, although some states that apply traditional
principles to torts adopt modern doctrines for contracts and vice
152
versa.
There is considerable diversity even among the smaller
subgroup of states that hear the majority of Indian-law cases. New
153
Mexico,
for example, follows traditional principles; Arizona,
146. See Shreve, supra note 165, at 189-90.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 156(2).
150. SHREVE, supra note 132, at 187-90.
151. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004:
Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 944 (2004) (cataloging state-to-state
differences in choice-of-law methodology).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, South Dakota, and Utah
generally follow the Second Restatement; and California, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin follow other modern
155
principles.
Nonetheless, despite the increased variety that prevails in the postSecond Restatement era, the choice-of-law principles of many states
continue to have elements in common. For example, most states take
into account, to a greater or lesser extent, some or all of the following
factors: the domicile, residence, and workplace of the parties; the
place of relevant events; the interests of the various states whose law
156
may be at issue; and the expectations of the parties.
Further,
157
choice-of-law theory has not escaped its traditional territoriality.
Sometimes the territorial element is obvious, in both traditional
factors such as the place of injury and “modern” ones such as party
domicile. Other factors have a subtler territorial component. Party
expectations, for example, may be affected by the place where the
158
majority of relevant events, or the most significant ones, occurred.
Moreover, it is hard to talk about state governmental interest without
talking about geography, since states are generally considered to have
little or no legitimate interest in regulating events that occur outside
159
their borders and cause no effects inside them.
Whatever their other differences, choice-of-law theories tend to
rely on a place-based notion of political power—the idea that states
have legitimate interests in the events that occur within their borders
and the people who reside there. There is inevitable difficulty in
translating these notions to the Indian-law context, where the scope
of tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction is not based merely
on geography, but on a complex mix of geography, land ownership,
160
tribal membership, and strength of tribal interests.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1306
(1989) (“Clearly there is no way to formulate a choice of law regime other than to
found it upon territorial assumptions of some sort.”).
158. Any regime based on party expectations is, of course, inevitably circular:
people’s expectations will be shaped by what the law is. But the expectation that,
within territorial boundaries of a given sovereign, one is subject to that sovereign’s
law is a deeply entrenched one that changes in choice-of-law practice are unlikely to
dislodge easily.
159. Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1306.
160. See Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 437, 478 (1998) (“The extent to which tribal power is based on territorial
dominion instead of consent, and the scope of tribal adjudicatory, regulatory, and
taxation authority over nonmembers, are indeed perplexing questions, which in turn
have produced inharmonious answers from the Supreme Court in recent years.”).
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B. Making Sense of Choice of Law in the Tribal Context
The following Section considers how choice-of-law concepts might
be applied in the tribal context. This Section first considers the
issues that arise—both in the abstract and in practice—when state
courts attempt to apply territorial notions in a realm in which the
reach of sovereign authority is more uncertain. Second, it considers
how a choice-of-law approach might be better suited than the current
case-allocation regime to creating fair and efficient ways of resolving
disputes that contain tribal contacts.
1. The initial problem of translation
The territorial emphasis shared by most choice-of-law systems rests
on the normally unproblematic assumption that a political entity has
jurisdiction over events that occur within its borders, and further that
161
such borders are familiar, predictable, and easy to discern. In the
Indian-law context, such assumptions do not always hold. The
reservation’s boundaries may be clear, but the reservation is
nonetheless a place where, the Supreme Court has told us, tribes and
162
states share regulatory authority; conversely, under the statutory
163
definition of “Indian country,” tribal authority may extend to
pockets of Indian-owned land outside the reservation. Further,
according to the Montana line of cases, the degree of authority the
tribe possesses over a particular parcel of land depends not only on
whether it is within or outside Indian country, but also on a host of
164
other factors: whether or not the land is tribal trust land; if the
land is privately owned, whether it is owned by a member or a
165
nonmember of the tribe; whether the state has a right-of-way over
166
167
the land; whether the land is especially significant to tribal life;
161. As one commentator observed, for example, “[a] rule of law may be
construed either to apply to people, things and transactions within a state, or to
apply to the state’s subjects, wherever they may happen to be.” Juenger, supra note
135, at 11.
162. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989)(“States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory.”).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948).
164. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), one of the
rare cases in which the Court applied Montana’s “political integrity” exception,
illustrates the fact-bound nature of tribal legislative jurisdiction. The case concerned
two parcels of land located on the Yakima Reservation: a 160-acre tract owned by
Philip Brendale, who was “part Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation,” and
who had inherited the parcel from family members; and a 40-acre tract “bordered on
the north by trust land and on the other three sides by fee land,” owned by Stanley
Wilkinson, a non-Indian and nonmember. Id. at 417-18. Further complicating
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and even whether the land is deep within the reservation or closer to
168
its borders.
As a result, the answers to normally straightforward choice-of-law
questions are more complicated when events occur in Indian
country. When an Indian is injured on a reservation by the negligent
conduct of nonmember, for example, what is the “place” of the injury
for choice-of-law purposes? The most obvious answer, of course, is
that the place is the reservation itself. Yet this assumption is not free
of difficulties. A tribe does not have complete control over its own
territory; in all likelihood, it could not hale the nonmembertortfeasor into its own courts, and it could not otherwise exercise
sovereign power to fine or punish the nonmember for her
169
behavior.
While the reservation is clearly the “place” of the injury
in the geographical sense, it is less obvious that it is the “place” in a
choice-of-law sense.
Other choice-of-law factors state courts consider may also be
difficult to translate into the Indian-law context. Some courts, for
example, take into account the parties’ domicile in deciding which
170
state’s law to apply.
For purposes of determining jurisdiction in
matters, Brendale’s parcel was in a forested “closed area” of the reservation open
only to Yakima Nation members and permittees; Wilkinson’s parcel was in an
unrestricted “open area” of which nearly half was fee land. Id. at 415-16. In an
opinion composed of fractured pluralities, the Court held that Brendale’s parcel fell
within the “political integrity” exception to Montana and was thus subject to tribal
zoning regulations; Wilkinson’s, however, did not. Justice Stevens’s concurrence,
which announced the Court’s judgment on Brendale’s parcel, found that the
division of the reservation lands into a closed area consisting mostly of nonfee land
and an open area with a large percentage of fee land was a fact of “critical
importance” to the case. Id. at 437. Justice Stevens further relied on the character of
the closed area’s use as an “undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious
significance,” noting that the tribe had invoked its power to exclude nonmembers
from the area and thus “preserved the power to define the essential character of that
area.” Id. at 441. While acknowledging that his opinion was subject to the criticism
that “it does not identify a bright-line rule,” Justice Stevens defended his approach
on the grounds that “the factual predicate to these cases is itself complicated” such
that it was impossible for the Court to “articulate precise rules.” Id. at 447-48.
168. Id. at 441.
169. Cf. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990) (rejecting tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on grounds that tribes are “limited sovereigns,
necessarily subject to the overriding authority of the United States”).
170. Brilmayer has described domicile as having two components—“voice and
exit.” Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1307. While the concept of “exit” should
presumably mean the same thing in the Indian-law context as it does in relations
between states—that is, people have the same choice whether to live on or leave the
reservation as they do whether to leave or remain in a given state—the idea of “voice”
is more complex, since tribes commonly grant voting rights only to members.
Should “voice” be understood narrowly as having to do with political rights, and
should only members of the tribe therefore be considered fully “domiciled” on the
reservation? Or should domicile encompass a broader notion of community and
self-identification, so that nonmembers who live on the reservation, particularly if
they have ties to the tribe or participate in tribal life, should be considered to have
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Indian law, however, a party’s decision to live on or off the
reservation has always been secondary to the facts of that person’s
race (Indian or non-Indian) and political status (member or
171
nonmember of the tribe). Should the same be true in choice-of-law
determinations? Questions of domicile—and of other choice-of-law
factors—may also be intertwined with concepts of “place”; domicile,
172
for example, depends on the place where a litigant resides. Thus,
the uncertainties inherent in defining “place” in the tribal-law
context are also relevant here.
State courts mostly have dealt with these problems by ignoring
them. Only very rarely have state courts have considered whether
their choice-of-law principles require them to apply tribal law; in the
few occasions when state courts have addressed the issue, they have
173
often quickly dismissed the possibility of applying tribal law.
Whatever problems may exist in applying choice-of-law principles
to the tribal context, this clearly cannot always be the right result.
That is, however restrictively one understands the meaning of core
choice-of-law concepts such as “place” or “domicile,” cases
unquestionably exist in which a consistent application of choice-oflaw principles should dictate the application of tribal law.
To see how this is so, consider the traditional principle that the law
174
of the place of the injury should control in tort cases.
In this
context, the phrase “the law of the place” might be said to mean one
of two things. One might choose to place the emphasis on “place”—
in other words, the entity within whose geographical borders an event
occurs—and then apply the law of the sovereign with which that
place is associated. In other words, if an event occurs within the
made the reservation their domicile?
171. See, e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 443 n.2 (finding that question of whether plaintiff
resided on the reservation was “immaterial”).
172. See Brilmayer, supra note 157 (noting that choice-of-law categories inevitably
have geographical dimensions).
173. See, e.g., Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 So. 2d 247, 249 (Miss. 1997)
(stating, without elaboration, that state and tribal law on a given subject were
identical and choice-of-law analysis hence unnecessary); Warm Springs Forest Prods.
Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. 1986) (finding that
Oregon law applied to contract entered into by a tribal corporation); Louis v. United
States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 n.5 (D.N.M. 1999) (finding that, under federal
statute, Congress likely intended state, rather than tribal, law to apply because of the
“difficulty in proving the existence and substance of any tribal law on the subject of
the tort”). Courts may also recast what is essentially a tribal-law issue as a
jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Begay v. Roberts, 807 P.2d 1111, 1117 (Ariz. App. 1990)
(holding that the lower court, while possessing jurisdiction over the underlying case,
lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment against a Navajo defendant’s wages
because Navajo law did not provide for such a remedy).
174. This analysis is also relevant to other choice-of-law factors that have a
territorial component.
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reservation, the reservation is the “place,” and the “law of the place”
is therefore tribal law. Second, one might, alternatively, place the
emphasis on “law,” and view the phrase instead as referring to the
sovereign possessing direct regulatory authority over events that
occur in a particular place. When an event occurs within a
reservation, either the state or the tribe might have that authority,
depending on the various relevant factors enumerated in the
175
Montana line of cases. Thus, under the second view, if the conduct
at issue occurs, say, on the private land of a nonmember, the “law of
176
the place,” if understood to mean the law that actually applies in that
place, under those circumstances, may be state law, even if the land is
nominally located within the reservation.
However, there will certainly be cases in which both definitions are
satisfied—where, for example, a tort occurs within the geographical
boundaries of a reservation under circumstances in which the tribe
would have authority to regulate the tortfeasor’s conduct. When this
is the case, the conclusion seems inescapable that, under most
choice-of-law principles, tribal law should apply; what, other than
tribal law, could possibly qualify as the “law of the place”? Indeed, if
177
one takes seriously some of the Court’s language in Wold II,
application of state law under such circumstances might be
preempted under federal law as conflicting with federal policies
promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government.
Many other situations exist in which state courts should in theory
have little difficulty applying tribal law. The factor of domicile, for
example, is surely satisfied when a litigant is a tribe member and lives
on the reservation. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that a party
who is a member of the tribe and performs an action on tribal trust
land expects that tribal law will apply to his conduct; in states that
place weight on the factor of party expectations, therefore, a strong
argument would exist that tribal law should apply under such
175. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001) (suggesting that ownership
of tribal land is only one factor and alone insufficient to “support regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers”).
176. The question of which law “applies” to particular events is a somewhat
circular one when the subject under discussion is choice-of-law doctrine. When a
case concerning certain events is brought before a state court, the law that “applies”
to those events will be the law of whatever sovereign the court chooses to apply. In a
more narrow sense, however, it can be said that state law, rather than tribal law,
applies to certain events taking place within the reservation because the tribe has no
power to exercise its regulatory authority over those events.
177. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986) (describing a requirement that tribes submit to
state law as a prerequisite to access to state court as a “severe intrusion” on their
sovereignty).
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circumstances. Finally, many states have adopted by statute choice-oflaw principles that appear to allow for the application of tribal law.
For example, provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code allow
178
parties to a contract great latitude to select what law should apply.
Under such statutes, there is no apparent barrier to allowing parties
to elect by contract to have tribal law apply to contracts involving
179
tribes or their members.
2. The question of legislative authority
The cases described above are the “easy” cases—cases in which
state choice-of-law principles dictate the application of tribal law even
if concepts like “place” and “domicile” are given their narrowest
possible meaning.
Such cases do not, however, exhaust the
circumstances under which tribal law might apply to cases that
appear in state court. In fact, to take such a narrow view would be an
anomaly in state choice-of-law practice given that states generally
construe such concepts expansively. Under the normal application
of state choice-of-law principles, therefore, one can make a case that
tribal law should apply to certain cases in which the tribe would lack
legislative authority to regulate the underlying conduct.
Although this may seem a controversial suggestion, it is in fact
highly consistent with general state choice-of-law practices. For
example, where state-to-state conflicts of law are concerned, courts
have generally assumed that “place” refers to any location within a
state or nation’s geographical boundaries, not to the abstract reach of
180
that entity’s sovereign authority.
This is even true, perhaps even
especially so, in states that follow the traditional principles of the First
Restatement, which are designed to establish bright-line, formalistic
181
rules that apply regardless of real-world conditions.
The famous
178. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999) (parties may agree that their rights and duties will
be governed by the law of a non-forum state or nation if such law bears a “reasonable
relation” to the transaction).
179. In practice, such situations have been relatively uncommon, since contractual
clauses specifying that tribal law will be applied to disputes often also require that
suits be brought in tribal court. Nonetheless, after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hicks, it may be the case that parties have a greater ability to elect that their dispute
be governed by tribal law than they do to ensure that their case will be heard in a
tribal forum. See supra note 113.
180. The majority of states have followed the geographic approaches of traditional
choice-of-law doctrine articulated in the First and Second Restatement. Symeonides,
supra note 151, at 944.
181. Though the court in Carroll used Beale’s now-discredited vested rights
approach as a rationale for reaching this result, most courts that still subscribe to
traditional principles have applied them based on other justifications, such as that of
predictability and ease of administration. See, e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550
(W. Va. 1986).
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case of Alabama Great Southern RR Co. v. Carroll, for example,
involved a train passing through several Southern states. Negligent
maintenance of the train in Alabama caused a link between two cars
183
in a freight train to break in Mississippi, injuring the plaintiff.
184
Although the plaintiff claimed that Alabama law should apply, the
court nonetheless applied Mississippi law because it was in Mississippi
185
that the injury had occurred.
The court reached this conclusion
despite the fact that Mississippi would certainly have had no power to
pass laws directly regulating the maintenance of trains in Alabama.
While the doctrinal reasons why tribes cannot directly regulate most
nonmember conduct are of course somewhat different from the
reasons Mississippi cannot regulate conduct outside its borders, it is
difficult to see why the two situations should be, for choice-of-law
186
purposes, distinguishable.
Indeed, in certain cases under the traditional approach, the courts
of the state whose law is to be applied may lack both adjudicative and
regulatory jurisdiction over the matter; this might be the case if, for
example, a state’s long-arm statute allows for only limited jurisdiction
187
over nonresidents in state court.
Thus, one could make the
argument that if states were to apply the more restrictive view of the
notion of “law of the place,” as described above, to cases with tribal
contacts, they would in fact be departing from ordinary choice-of-law
practice. It is, therefore, perfectly in keeping with normal state
choice-of-law principles to view “place” as geographical place. Under
traditional lex loci delicti principles, tribal law should apply to many
cases that arise in an Indian “place”—even if that place is, for
example, privately owned nonmember land within the boundaries of
a reservation.
182. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
183. Id. at 805.
184. Because Mississippi law followed the rule immunizing employers from
liability for accidents caused by a fellow employee, plaintiffs could state a claim only
under the law of Alabama, which had abandoned this rule. Id.
185. Id. at 809.
186. By way of analogy, a federal criminal statute incorporating tribal law has been
held to apply even in cases where the tribe itself would not have the power to
prosecute the underlying violation. The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (1981),
makes it a criminal violation to buy or sell fish or wildlife taken in violation of any
United States or tribal law. Federal convictions under the Act have been sustained
even where the tribe would not itself have the authority to enforce its laws against the
defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Big Eagle, 881 F.2d 539, 540 (8th Cir. 1989). See
also COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.06[2], at 653 (noting that application of tribal law in
choice-of-law analysis may be appropriate even where the tribe would lack legislative
jurisdiction to regulate the underlying conduct).
187. See supra note 97 (identifying cases in which states lack ordinary regulatory
jurisdiction, while plainly wielding adjudicative jurisdiction).
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In states that follow more modern, multifactor choice-of-law
theories, the path to application of tribal law may be, if anything,
even clearer. In fact, once one overcomes the initial hurdle of
translating choice-of-law concepts to the Indian-law context, certain
of the “modern” approaches—in particular, interest analysis and the
“most significant relationship” approach of the Second
Restatement—lend themselves peculiarly well to cases involving tribal
188
contacts.
Consider first how theories incorporating interest analysis might
apply. Suppose a tribe—call it Tribe A—enacts an ordinance
requiring creditors to seek authorization from the tribe before
repossessing property from a tribe member residing on the
189
reservation. The governmental policy reflected in this rule is fairly
clear: to protect the tribe members from arbitrary or unwarranted
seizures of property. Further, the nature of the governmental policy
underlying the ordinance does not change simply because, under
Strate and Hicks, the tribe’s ability to enforce it against nonmembers
190
in tribal court is limited. Tribe A, that is, likely has an equal interest
in protecting its members from unfair seizures by members and those
by nonmembers; it simply lacks jurisdiction to hold nonmembers
accountable for their conduct in tribal court.
Now suppose that, under the law of State B, a secured creditor in
general has the right to use self-help to repossess property on which a
debtor has defaulted. Let us assume that State B has passed this law
in order to protect the financial interest of in-state corporations that
191
have agreed to sell goods on credit. In any given case, however, this
interest may or may not be implicated. If, for example, the original
188. In fact, such methods bear some similarities to courts’ current forumcentered approach. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 726 (noting that “[f]ederal
[jurisdictional] law about Indians is a type of ‘interest analysis,’ a concept central to
modern doctrine on Conflicts of Law”). See also COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.06[2], at
653 (suggesting that interest analysis might lead state courts to apply tribal law in
some cases).
189. See, e.g., Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 68 (N.M. 2003)
(describing situation where an Indian defendant counterclaimed against the
collection-agency plaintiff for failing to obtain the defendant’s consent or a tribal
court order before repossessing defendant’s car).
190. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (limiting tribes’ civil
authority to situations where a nonmember enters into consensual relationship with
the tribe or when the activity directly affects the tribe’s political integrity, economic
security, health or welfare); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (arguing that
the mere existence of tribal ownership is not sufficient to confer regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers).
191. This was the case in Belone. New Mexico had adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, which gives secured parties the right to use self-help in
repossessing property. Belone, 74 P.3d at 68-69 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-503
(1978) (repealed 2001)).
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deal had been struck in State C between a Tribe A member and a
State C corporation, and the Tribe A member sued in State B court
192
for violation of the tribal statute, State B would have no interest in
applying its law, while Tribe A would have an interest in ensuring the
security of its member’s property. Under Currie’s view, this would
therefore constitute a “false conflict” to which Tribe A law should
193
apply.
If the corporation were in fact located in State B, of course, a real
conflict would exist—Tribe A’s interest in protecting its members and
State B’s interest in protecting its creditors could not both be
accommodated. Currie’s approach would, in such a situation, apply
194
However, other governmental-interest-based theories,
forum law.
such as Leflar’s “better law” principle or Baxter’s “comparative
195
impairment” approach, might by contrast point toward tribal law.
Whatever the outcome, however, each of these theories has the
advantage of allowing state courts to step back from the caseallocation rules established by Montana and Williams to consider what
stake the tribe actually has in any given case. Unlike Montana and
Williams, that is, which give different weight to a tribe’s interests in
litigation depending on whether a tribe member is a plaintiff or
defendant and whether the other litigant involved is Indian or nonIndian, governmental interest analysis allows state courts to take into
account a tribe’s legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its
196
members in all of these situations.
Approaches that rely on assessing the quantity and significance of
contacts with various jurisdictions—predominantly taken by the
Second Restatement—are also well suited to the tribal-law context.
In state-to-state conflicts, these approaches are often derided as mere
197
“contact-counting.”
In the tribal-law context, however, where the
192. The original deal in Belone was reached in Arizona, although the contract was
later assigned to a New Mexico corporation. Id. at 68.
193. See Currie, supra note 131, at 238 (examining instances of false conflicts
where the states’ laws may differ, but only one state has a genuine interest in the
application of its law).
194. See Currie, supra note 131, at 178 (reasoning that forum law should apply
unless the forum state lacked an interest and the foreign state had an interest).
195. Compare Baxter, supra note 139, at 18 (proposing that courts should resolve
conflicts between state laws by determining which of the state’s internal objectives
will be “least impaired . . . by subordination” to the other state’s interest), with Leflar,
supra note 140, at 1586-88 (advocating the consideration of multiple factors to
resolve conflicts in the interest of public policy).
196. See Currie, supra note 131, at 178 (suggesting that “to effectuate the legislative
purpose,” courts should “inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is
such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application
of that policy”).
197. See SHREVE, supra note 132, at 190 (discussing the reception of the Second
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people who reside on reservations often have varying levels of tribal
affiliation, an approach that relies on assessing the number and
quality of contacts may be the best way to establish whether a given
resident, or a given case, has meaningful or only incidental
connections with the tribe. A state court applying the Second
Restatement might choose, for example, to apply state rather than
tribal law in a tort action involving a tourist with no ties to the tribe,
whose negligent conduct occurred off the reservation, even if the
198
injury itself occurred in Indian country.
By the same token, in a
case concerning a defendant who lives and works within reservation
199
boundaries, who is married to a tribe member, and whose negligent
conduct occurred on tribal land, the decision to apply tribal law may
be a relatively easy one, even if the defendant is not technically a
member of the tribe. Thus, unlike current doctrine, which often
assigns cases to a state or tribal forum based on a single factor, such as
200
the defendant’s identity, the Second Restatement approach allows
the many factors that may be applicable in a case with tribal contacts
201
to be given appropriate weight.
Finally, as the third Section explores in more detail, exceptions
common to most choice-of-law systems may also be particularly
helpful in the tribal context. Many states, for example, permit courts
to avoid application of a jurisdiction’s law, even if choice-of-law
principles would otherwise call for it, on grounds that it is against
202
public policy.
While this exception has sometimes been criticized
for giving courts too much discretion to make policy choices, it may
be a useful escape device to allow state courts to avoid the application
Restatement by the academic community, ranging from praise and mixed
impressions to criticism).
198. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 721 (noting that under the Second Restatement,
the law of the state where the injury occurred will usually apply).
199. Many tribes, for example, may require a certain blood quantum for
membership. Thus, tribe members’ spouses and relatives may be ineligible, but are
clearly members of the community. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
443 (1997) (illustrating the requirement for a certain blood quantum for
membership where the plaintiff, while not a tribe member, had a husband and
children who were members).
200. See, e.g., Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(remanding case to determine whether the defendant was Indian or non-Indian for
the purposes of evaluating jurisdiction).
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (including
factors such as the place of conduct causing the injury; the domicile, residence, and
place of business of the parties; and the place where the parties’ relationship was
based).
202. See Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731,
735 (1990) (“Although it remains controversial, most courts consider, either
explicitly or implicitly, which set of applicable laws is better as a matter of social
policy and justice.”).
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of tribal law in situations where the matter at issue is clearly an
internal tribal one and state-court involvement would offend tribal
autonomy.
3. The actual experience of state courts
On a theoretical level, therefore, there appear to be few obstacles
to applying any of the major choice-of-law theories to cases involving
tribal contacts. In practice, too, nontribal courts that have explicitly
considered the issue have had relatively little difficulty in concluding
that choice-of-law principles may under certain circumstances dictate
203
the application of tribal law. In Tempest Recovery Services v. Belone, for
example, a member of the Navajo Nation, living outside the
boundaries of the reservation on allotted Indian land in New Mexico,
204
defaulted on payments for a car purchased in Arizona.
The
installment contract provided that the “law of the state where the
205
Tempest,
property is repossessed” would govern the transaction.
the car dealer, entered Belone’s allotted land, repossessed the car,
206
and sued in New Mexico court for the outstanding balance. Belone
counterclaimed for damages, citing a Navajo law providing that
“[t]he personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken from
the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation” unless authorized by
207
Navajo judicial process or the purchaser’s written consent.
The court first found that, under Williams, it had jurisdiction over
Tempest’s claim (because it had arisen outside Indian country) and
over Belone’s (because, while Belone’s cause of action had arisen in
Indian country, Belone had chosen to bring his counterclaim in state
208
court). Finding that the tribe had “territorial jurisdiction” over
Indian country, the court concluded that a “choice-of-law issue . . .
follow[ed]” from the fact that Belone’s counterclaim had arisen
there, and remanded the case to allow the district court to determine,
“under choice-of-law rules,” whether New Mexico or Navajo law
209
applied.
203. 74 P.3d 67, 68 (N.M. 2003).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 69. The court found that this constituted, under New Mexico choice-oflaw doctrine, an effective contractual choice of law. Id. The court took care to note,
however, that Navajo law contained an equivalent contractual choice-of-law
provision. Id.
206. Id. at 68.
207. Id. at 69.
208. Id. at 71-72.
209. Id. at 71, 71 n.2 (“State courts applying normal choice of law principles
should frequently apply tribal law to issues arising in Indian Country.”) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). The court’s reasoning was murky in some respects; the
court apparently assumed that the parties had intended their contract to be
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One of the more notable aspects of the case was the court’s
decision to treat the Navajo Nation as a separate sovereign for choiceof-law purposes, and its conclusion that any part of Indian country
should be treated as Navajo “territory” for purposes of determining
210
where a claim had arisen. In other words, the court did not analyze
the applicability of Navajo law by examining in detail whether the
tribe would have had regulatory or adjudicatory authority over the
211
transaction under the Montana test. Instead, it simply assumed, in
essence, that any location within Indian country constituted a Navajo
“place” for the purpose of determining, under state choice-of-law
principles, whether Navajo law should apply.
212
Similarly, in Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., a case involving the same
Navajo repossession law, an Arizona appellate court suggested that
circumstances might exist under which comity would dictate
application of tribal law under choice-of-law principles. Although the
court ultimately concluded that the parties had made a valid
213
contractual election of Arizona law, it left open the possibility that
the principle of comity might under different circumstances oblige a
214
state court to apply tribal law.
Although the court questioned
whether the Navajo Nation was genuinely an “independent sovereign
jurisdiction,” it nevertheless noted that, applying principles of comity,
215
Arizona had given effect to Navajo court decisions. As a result, the
court concluded,
[I]f a sufficient independent status exists in the Navajo Tribe for
the courts of this state to recognize the validity of Navajo Tribal
Court decisions, then, under principles of comity, like recognition
should be extended to legislative enactments of the Navajo Tribal
Council, provided, of course, such legislative enactments are not
216
contrary to the public policy of this state.

governed by New Mexico choice-of-law principles, but not New Mexico substantive
law. Thus, the court applied New Mexico choice-of-law doctrine to determine where
the counterclaim had arisen, but appeared to assume that, because that place was
Indian country, Navajo substantive law should apply. See id. at 72.
210. See id. at 72 n.3 (upholding the Supreme Court’s recognition of the authority
of tribal courts and the need to apply an “exhaustion doctrine” allowing a tribal
court to determine its own jurisdiction before a federal court can hear the case).
211. In passing, the court did cite Montana, as well as an earlier New Mexico case,
Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088, 1092 (N.M. App. 1997), in which
the court had held that, on similar facts, the Navajo court would have civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Belone, 74 P.3d at 71-72.
212. 571 P.2d 689, 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
213. Id.
214. See id. at 695.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Again, the court did not limit potential application of tribal law to
situations in which the tribe would have adjudicative jurisdiction.
Instead, the court suggested that since Arizona courts treated the
Navajo Nation as a sister sovereign for one purpose—enforcing the
judgments of tribal courts—it should also treat it as a sovereign in
other respects, such as the application of tribal law under choice-oflaw principles.
Several federal cases have addressed nearly identical choice-of-law
217
issues in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which
waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for tortious acts that
occur within the United States, specifying that courts should apply
218
“the law of the place where the omission occurred.”
For many
years, courts ignored the potential applicability of tribal law when an
accident occurred in Indian country, applying state law to all issues
219
even when tribal lands were involved.
In 1999, however, a federal
220
district court in Cheromiah v. United States changed the terms of
debate by applying tribal law to a malpractice suit arising from actions
that occurred at a federally operated hospital on tribal lands.
The question at issue in Cheromiah was whether a New Mexico state
cap on medical malpractice damages should govern a claim arising
out of allegedly negligent treatment at an Indian Health Services
221
facility on the Acoma reservation.
Plaintiffs argued that Acoma
tribal law, which had no damage cap, constituted the “law of the
222
place where the omission occurred” under the federal statute.
Departing from prior interpretations, the court agreed, rejecting the
223
view that “law of the place” means exclusively “law of the state.”
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2001).
218. See, e.g., Washabaugh v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 623, 625 (M.D. Pa. 1949)
(concluding that in a car accident between a Pennsylvania resident and a U.S. Army
station wagon, Maryland’s standards and tests determined whether the claim had
been established and what recovery was appropriate).
219. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 696 (describing several circuit decisions involving
Indian parties or Indian land).
220. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999).
221. Id. at 1297.
222. Id. at 1301-02.
223. See id. at 1305-06 (distinguishing the instant case from other interpretations,
noting that the application of tribal law was never raised on the FTCA claims). The
Cheromiah court was not obliged to consider the more problematic situation
described above, in which an action arose on an identifiably tribal “place” over which
the tribe might be found to lack regulatory or adjudicative jurisdiction—such as a
tort committed by a nonmember defendant on tribal land. See id. at 1297
(describing the hospital, where doctors failed to diagnose or treat a bacterial
infection that caused an individual’s death as “located within the bounds of Acoma
tribal land”). This is because the FTCA imposes an additional requirement,
subjecting the United States to liability only “under circumstances where [it], if a
private person, would be liable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). Because of this
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224

In another FTCA claim, Louis v. United States, the court disagreed
with Cheromiah and concluded that Congress did not intend “place”
225
in the FTCA to refer to Indian country. Interestingly, however, the
court went on to suggest that, even if “law of the place” meant New
Mexico law, tribal law could nonetheless potentially be applied to the
226
claim under New Mexico choice-of-law principles.
The plaintiff
argued that, because New Mexico followed the lex loci delicti doctrine,
tribal law should govern because the negligent conduct had occurred
227
at a tribal hospital.
Because the plaintiff had, however, ultimately
died in a New Mexico hospital, the court found that the hospital was
228
the place of the wrong and rejected this argument.
However, by
accepting that ordinary New Mexico choice-of-law principles applied,
the Louis court implicitly left open the possibility that application of
tribal law might have been proper had the plaintiff’s death occurred
229
within the boundaries of Indian country.
The application of choice-of-law principles to events in Indian
country is thus often surprisingly straightforward. Conversely, state
courts that have gone to great lengths to avoid application of tribal
requirement, the court was obliged to undertake the analysis of whether the tribe
would have jurisdiction over a private person in this situation under the principles of
Montana and Strate. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. In this case, because the
United States had entered into a contract to provide medical services to the Acoma,
the court concluded that the tribe would have had jurisdiction under Montana’s
exception for consensual relationships. Id. at 1304. The court also found that
because the hospital was the sole source of western medical care for nearly all
Acoma, its alleged malpractice was more than an “isolated tort;” it had the potential
to “jeopardize [the Acoma’s] very ability to survive as a people,” thus triggering
Montana’s second exception. Id. at 1305.
224. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999).
225. See id. at 1210 (reasoning that New Mexico law would determine the scope of
the government’s liability).
226. Id. at 1211.
227. Id. at 1210.
228. Id. at 1211. As a choice-of-law matter, this was the correct result. Lex loci
delicti principles look to the place where the cause of action first became complete—
i.e., where the injuries resulting from tortious conduct ultimately manifested
themselves.
229. A few courts have rejected Cheromiah’s conclusion, relying instead on older
precedents that treat “law of the place” as synonymous with “law of the state.” See,
e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1268 (D.N.M. 2002)
(citing various cases, none of which involved an event that occurred on reservation
lands); Bryant v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (D. Ariz. 2000) (declining to
follow Cheromiah because the cases upon which the Cheromiah court relied were
distinguishable and dealt with situations where the location of the negligent act was
not within the boundaries of any state). Other courts have considered the issue by
avoiding application of tribal law without directly rejecting Cheromiah’s reasoning.
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001). In Williams, the
Fourth Circuit acknowledged conflicting decisions on the question of whether tribal
law should be applied, but ultimately found that it need not decide the issue because
no Cherokee law existed on the subject and “any tribal resolution would look, in
these circumstances, to applicable federal and North Carolina law.” Id. at 176 n.2.
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law have often found themselves tied in doctrinal knots. The South
230
Dakota case of Risse v. Meeks is a stark example of the procedural
tangles the current forum-centered regime can create. The case
involved the non-Indian Risses, residing on off-reservation land in
South Dakota, who brought a suit in state court against the Meeks,
three members of the Ogala Sioux Tribe living on the reservation,
231
after cattle bearing the Meeks’ brands entered the Risses’ property.
The Risses alleged claims for trespass, for which they sought
232
Based on the Meeks’ alleged failure to
compensatory damages.
install a fence, the Risses also sought punitive damages for “willful,
233
wanton, and reckless conduct.”
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over
234
the first claim, but not the second. The first action, for trespass, was
based on damage to the Risses’ land, which was “undisputedly not
235
Indian Country.” The second cause of action, however, hinged on
236
the Meeks’ failure to construct a fence.
Under South Dakota law,
fences were a “fixture and part of the realty,” and the claim therefore
237
arose on Indian trust land, over which the court lacked jurisdiction.
In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice Konenkamp defended the result
on the ground that tribes should have the right to set standards of
238
conduct on tribal land.
The state of South Dakota, he noted,
lacked regulatory authority over “the construction and maintenance
of fences in Indian country;” thus, “imposing punitive damages for
fencing decisions on the reservation allows the state to do indirectly
239
what it could never do directly.” Instead, tribal courts should have
the ability to decide questions pertaining to “the alleged wrongful use
and possession of land located in Indian Country by a tribal Indian
240
defendant.”
To hold otherwise, would be to violate the principle
that Indians possessed the sovereign right to “make their own laws
241
and be governed by them.”

230. 585 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1998).
231. Id. at 875-76.
232. Id. at 876.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 877, 879.
235. Id. at 877.
236. Id. at 876.
237. Id. at 878.
238. See id. at 879 (Konenkamp, J., concurring) (criticizing the dissent for
“ignor[ing] well-settled exceptions to the rule against splitting causes of actions”).
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 487 (S.D. 1968) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
241. Id. (quoting Kain, 83 S.D. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The force of Konenkamp’s argument, however, was entirely
dependent on the view that the Risses’ lawsuit could be seen as
asserting two entirely different claims—one relating to actions on
state territory, and one concerning internal reservation matters. By
contrast, the dissenting justices viewed the trespass as a single cause
242
243
A dissent by Justice Amundson emphasized that
of action.
splitting the case would be an “odd procedure” because the punitive
damages claim “merely constitute[d] an element of recovery on the
underlying cause of action[,] . . . not an independent or additional
244
cause of action which can be separated and stand on its own.” As
Amundson noted, what the court was doing in effect was not splitting
claims but splitting different sorts of evidence relating to a single
claim—evidence relating to the claim for compensatory damages in
state court and evidence relating to the “punitive damage portion of
245
the claim” in tribal court. Notably, Amundson recognized that state
law should not be imposed on the tribal defendants with respect to
the punitive damages claim; instead, “[t]he conduct that may warrant
punitive damages, if any, will have to be evaluated based upon the
rules or laws of the place where the conduct occurs, namely tribal
246
land.”
As the dissenting justices appeared to recognize, choice-of-law
analysis might have clarified the court’s analysis and simplified
decision of an essentially uncomplicated case. Had the court instead
considered the option of applying Ogala Sioux law to the question of
punitive damages, it would have been able to answer Justice
Konenkamp’s objection that the state should not be in the business
of imposing standards of conduct in Indian country without the need
to artificially separate the claim into two parts. In other words, Ogala
Sioux standards of conduct would continue to govern how the Meeks
fenced their farm, but the plaintiffs would not have been forced to
split their cause of action between two forums.

242. See generally id. at 881-84 (Admundson & Sabers, JJ., dissenting).
243. Justice Sabers, who also dissented, saw things similarly. He first observed
that, “[t]he dispositive principle of law in this case is the majority rule that an action
for trespass to real property must be brought where the real property is situated,”
thus necessitating that the trespass claim be brought in state court rather than tribal
court. Id. at 881. In Sabers’ view, the punitive damages claim was “not a separate or
independent cause of action,” but a “dependent, ancillary punitive damage claim.”
Id. Thus, there was no need to create a “multiplicity of suits” by forcing the Risses to
split their claim between state and tribal court. Id. at 882.
244. Id. at 883.
245. Id. at 884.
246. Id. at 883-84 n.5.
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This case also illustrates how the rule of Williams places excessive
emphasis on the form of a lawsuit. The decision to define the Risses’
punitive damages claim as a separate cause of action meant that the
state lacked power to assert jurisdiction over it, since under Williams,
state courts are not permitted to hear suits against Indian defendants
247
By contrast, if the
arising out of on-reservation transactions.
punitive damages claim had been defined as part of the Risses’ statelaw cause of action, Williams would presumably impose no barrier to
248
allowing it to be heard in state court.
Under Risse, therefore,
whether the tribe had any say in setting standards of conduct for its
members essentially hinged on a quirk of South Dakota procedure—
that is, whether South Dakota regarded a particular legal demand as
249
constituting two claims or one.
4.

Procedural advantages of the choice-of-law approach
The preceding Section has suggested some of the ways in which a
choice-of-law approach would often be more fair, predictable, and
efficient than the current way in which most states treat cases with
247. See id. at 878 (adhering to the proposition that “[i]t is common ground here
that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the State’s
jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern of tribal or federal authorities”).
248. See id. at 878-79 (noting that courts have rejected personal dissatisfaction with
tribal court jurisdiction as a valid basis for obtaining jurisdiction in another court
system).
249. Even when a case does not present such complicated procedural
conundrums, state courts’ reluctance to apply tribal law may lead to unfair results
and cause states to distort the way in which their choice-of-law principles are
normally applied. In Warm Springs Forest Products Industries v. Employee Benefits
Insurance Company, 716 P.2d 740, 741 (Or. 1986), the Oregon Supreme Court
applied Oregon law to a dispute between a non-Indian insurer and its insured, a
tribal enterprise owned by the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation
of Oregon, despite arguments by the tribal enterprise that the parties had intended
for Warm Springs law to apply. In reaching this conclusion, the court seemed to rely
as much on the fact that discovering the applicable tribal law might be burdensome
as on any convincing evidence of the parties’ intentions, a position for which it was
criticized by the dissent. Id. at 748-49. Notably, the majority explicitly rejected
Warm Springs’ argument that Oregon’s choice-of-law principles dictated the
application of tribal law. Id. at 743. Application of Oregon law had the effect of
invalidating an oral rebate agreement, which the plaintiff alleged was the main
reason it had purchased the policy. Thus, the tribe argued, Oregon law should not
be applied under the Second Restatement, which provided that “a contractual choice
to apply foreign law which is contrary to the fundamental public policy of the place
where the contract is made and performed will not be given effect.” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971)). Rejecting this
argument, the court found (over the dissent’s strong objections) that interpreting
the policy to make an election of Oregon law would not be contrary to tribal policy.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a provision of Warm Springs law
that stated that Oregon law was to be applied Oregon law to tribal matters where it
did not conflict with “Indian written or customary law.” Id. But the court refused to
undertake the examination of whether such conflicting Indian law existed in the first
instance, making its reasoning inevitably somewhat circular.
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tribal contacts. The advantages of a choice-of-law approach, however,
extend much more broadly. Most fundamentally, such a practice
would acknowledge a growing reality: that the extent of tribal
adjudicative and regulatory jurisdiction is frequently much narrower
than the scope of what most courts would acknowledge as tribes’
250
For example, when nonmembers are
legitimate interests.
responsible for torts whose effects are felt within a reservation’s
borders, all members of the tribe may feel that their safety and
security has decreased. The tribe, however, is likely to lack authority
either to regulate the nonmember’s behavior directly or to require
the matter to be heard in tribal court. Allowing state courts to apply
tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote tribal
autonomy and self-determination by providing a way in which tribal
251
interests can be taken into account.
A choice-of-law approach, however, also has more practical
procedural benefits. To begin with, choice-of-law analysis has the
potential to introduce a welcome element of territoriality into state
courts’ approach to claims arising on Indian reservations. As the
Supreme Court’s understanding of tribal legislative authority has
increasingly focused on tribal membership rather than on the
boundaries of reservations or of Indian country, tribes’ ability to
influence events that occur within their borders has been severely
252
weakened. Yet borders and a sense of place remain central to the
way most people conceive of sovereign nationhood, and decisions
based on territory foster a greater sense of certainty and
253
predictability.
Applying a choice-of-law approach that contains a
territorial component would heighten the significance of whether or
not an event occurs within “Indian country,” and thus allow tribal
sovereignty to have a surer geographical reach.
Moreover, choice-of-law methodologies generally allow courts some
flexibility to consider the facts of the case in an individualized way, a
250. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 702 (acknowledging the two exceptions to the
Supreme Court’s general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority: “The first
exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe’s political
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.”) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997)).
251. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999), for an
in-depth consideration of this perspective.
252. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 202-05 (discussing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)).
253. See Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1307 (offering that those domiciled in a
state, in order to change the political decisions that govern their lives, may either
vote or exit, thus enabling individuals to control the legal norms to which the
individuals will be subjected).
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quality particularly helpful in sorting out the tangled mixture of state
and tribal contacts that often characterizes state-court cases involving
Indians. Applying choice-of-law principles, a court could, for
example, decide that, of the plaintiff’s several related claims, some
should be governed by state law and some by tribal law. By contrast,
under a scheme that assumes each forum will apply its own law, a
plaintiff whose case involves both state and reservation contacts is
compelled to split her case between state and tribal court if she wants
tribal law to apply to any of her claims.
Further, because the choice of which law to apply is not a question
of jurisdiction, it can be made in combination with a determination
of the merits of the case. By contrast, if jurisdiction is uncertain, the
court will often be forced to engage in an extensive, fact-specific
inquiry before it has even established that it has the power to hear the
case. In particular, a choice-of-law approach that looks to the
number and quality of contacts between a defendant and the tribe
simply has more inherent flexibility than a forum-centered approach,
allowing courts to consider often-complex issues (such as the degree
of affiliation between a given litigant and a tribe) in a more precise,
254
case-by-case manner.
Encouraging state courts to apply tribal law in situations like the
ones described has the potential to create more consistent results and
reduce the possibilities for forum-shopping. Under a solely forumbased approach, whether state law or tribal law applies to a case may
be dictated by who sues whom first, and therefore whether the case is
assigned to state or tribal court. Further, where states and tribes have
concurrent jurisdiction, the absence of well-defined rules and
procedures for managing inter-jurisdictional conflicts encourages
litigants to forum shop aggressively and creates the potential for
255
procedural quagmires.
State and tribal courts may, for example,
254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (expanding
the court’s consideration in conflicts of law situations to factors such as the place of
conduct causing a injury; the domicile, residence, and place of business of the
parties; and the place where the parties’ relationship was based).
255. A particularly egregious example is the case of Teague v. Bad River Band
(Teague I), 612 N.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Wis. 2000), which presented a dizzying array of
interforum conflicts. A non-Indian contractor filed suit in state court alleging that
the Bad River Band had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. The Band, meanwhile,
took the case to tribal court for resolution of the same question. Id. at 713. In part
because the contractor refused to participate in the tribal proceedings, the tribal
court swiftly reached a judgment in the Band’s favor. The state trial court, however,
refused to give full faith and credit to the tribal judgment, finding that that the
Band’s filing of the second suit in tribal court constituted fraud and coercion;
further, it reached an opposite result on the substantive tribal-immunity question.
Id. at 712-13. Faced with an unappetizing choice between rewarding “the winner of
the race to the courthouse” or “the winner of the race to judgment,” id. at 714, 717,
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compete to be the first to reach judgments. Litigants who suspect
that tribal proceedings will fail to go their way may choose to ignore
them in hopes that their nonparticipation will cast doubt on the
256
proceedings’ legitimacy.
When jurisdiction is available in two
courts with sharply different cultural and legal perspectives, forum
choice may be entirely determinative of the outcome, heightening
incentives for procedural maneuvering and casting doubt on the
257
legitimacy of both courts’ proceedings.
Under a choice-of-law approach, however, which law applies is
determined by factors such as the place of relevant events and the
domicile of the litigants that remain constant regardless of the
258
configuration of the lawsuit.
Encouraging state courts to apply
tribal law in appropriate circumstances thus fulfills a classic function
of choice-of-law doctrine—avoiding a situation in which a plaintiff’s
choice of court determines a case’s outcome.
Finally, an advantage of interest analysis and Second Restatement
approaches in particular would be to allow courts to separate the
interest of tribal litigants from the interest of the tribe itself, and to
allow both to be accorded their proper weight. Under the current,
forum-based approach, that is, the Supreme Court has rarely
considered whether the tribe as a whole might have a stake in a given
case that differs from that of the individual litigants. In Fisher v.
District Court, for example, the Court concluded that, because tribal
adjudication of cases involving internal tribal matters would
strengthen tribal independence, it was also in the best interests of

the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case for the two courts to confer,
noting in passing that the adoption of procedures to govern such a situation was
acutely needed. Id. at 720. Despite the state supreme court’s hopes, however,
cooperation between the state and tribal courts did not result. On remand, the state
circuit court denied the Band’s request to open the judgment. Teague v. Bad River
Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Teague III), 665 N.W.2d 889, 903
(Wis. 2003). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, hearing the case once again on appeal,
finally resolved the instant dispute by holding in a fractured opinion that the tribal
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. Even so, the judges sharply disagreed
about the rationale. Id. at 903, 916.
256. See, e.g., Teague I, 612 N.W.2d at 713.
257. In the Teague cases, for example, it was clearly in the non-Indian plaintiff’s
best interest to have the case decided by a state judge skeptical of the Bad River
Band’s sovereign immunity argument, while it was equally logical for the Band to
seek a tribal judge who was more receptive to (and perhaps more knowledgeable
about) its claims of sovereign immunity under tribal law.
258. Id. Note in particular that a court considering which law to apply under
choice-of-law doctrine can consider the domicile of both plaintiff and defendant
under the particular circumstances of the case. Contra Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
222-23 (1959) (holding that the presence of a tribal defendant may cause the case to
be sent to tribal court, but the presence of a tribal plaintiff does not).
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259

individual Indian plaintiffs.
In Wold I and II, the Court took this
equation in the other direction, assuming that what was in the best
interest of Indian litigants—ready access to state courts—was also in
260
the best interest of tribes.
Of course, in many cases, there may be little difference in practice
between tribal and litigant interests. For example, cases involving
tribal contacts that appear in state court often involve tribal
corporations that are closely linked to the tribal government.
Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine cases where litigant and tribal
interests might diverge. A given Indian litigant, for example, might
prefer state law because it is more favorable in a certain situation,
while the tribe might favor a tribal ordinance intended to repair
relationships between Indian litigants.
Under current procedure, the interests of Indian litigants will be by
default given greater weight than the interests of the tribe simply
because litigants generally have more control over which court hears
the case. Where concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction exists, for
example, Indian plaintiffs have a choice about where to sue; while
defendants have less obvious control, they may be able to shape the
litigation in subtler ways—for example, by deciding whether or not to
press Williams objections when a case against them is brought in state
261
court. Choice-of-law approaches that allow for some consideration
of governmental interests would help to redress this balance by
allowing the tribe’s interests to be taken into account as well.
In certain circumstances, application of tribal law could benefit
state courts as well as tribes. A rule like “law of the place” is simple to
apply, and state courts might prefer navigating basic choice-of-law
principles to negotiating the complicated jurisdictional patchwork of
262
Montana.
A state court, therefore, might choose to treat a tribe
exactly as it does a sister state for choice-of-law purposes in order to
foster ease of administration and predictable results. Further, while
259. See supra n.77 (explaining the Fisher court conclusion that even if a
jurisdictional holding occasionally denies an Indian plaintiff access to state
jurisdiction, such treatment is justified and is intended to benefit Indians by
furthering Indian self-government).
260. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.c (examining the degree to which state courts
were obliged to provide access to Indian plaintiffs suing non-Indian defendants).
261. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.a (analyzing the principles set forth by Williams:
(1) if a non-Indian sues an Indian in a case arising in Indian country, the case must
be held in tribal court; and (2) in order for tribes to enjoy the right to be ruled by
their own laws, such laws must be enforced in tribal court).
262. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.a (explaining Montana’s two explicit exceptions
to limits on tribal powers: (1) activities of nonmembers who enter in consensual
relationships with the tribes and (2) where conduct of non-Indians threatens the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe).
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states and tribes have historically competed for authority over Indian
country, the judicial branches of both sovereigns have been moving
steadily toward greater cooperation. Many state and tribal courts now
263
enjoy friendly relations.
State courts might, therefore, make the
comity-based decision to treat tribes as ordinary sovereigns for choiceof-law purposes in order to help foster the mutually beneficial
relationships that many state and tribal courts have cultivated.
III. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF TRIBAL LAW
IN STATE COURT
Despite the apparent advantages described above, many state
courts have been reluctant to apply tribal law under choice-of-law
principles, and some Indian-law scholars have spoken against the
practice. This Part considers the arguments, both doctrinal and
policy-based, that courts and commentators have made against the
application of tribal law in state courts. The first Section focuses on
fairness to nonmembers, considering whether the application of
tribal law in state court might be limited by constitutional restrictions
or principles of federal Indian law that limit tribal sovereignty. The
second Section focuses on whether state-court application of tribal
law is in tension with Supreme Court cases protecting tribal
autonomy. Finally, the third Section considers more broadly whether
state-court application of tribal law should be discouraged because it
is impractical or not in tribes’ best interests.
A. States’ Authority to Apply Tribal Law To Nonmembers of the Tribe
The first question that must be addressed about the extent of
states’ authority to apply tribal law is whether tribal law may validly be
applied to nonmembers. After all, in the ordinary course of events,
litigants who are not members of a tribe cannot be made defendants
in tribal court; further, in most cases, the tribe cannot regulate their
conduct. In light of these facts, do Supreme Court precedents permit
tribal law to be applied to nonmembers at all?
In considering this question, it is important to note that decisions
about whether and how to apply tribal law in state court are, in the
first instance, questions of state law.
Modern courts and
263. To choose just one example, Carol Tebben describes a Wisconsin county
where “the chief judge of the state judicial district travels voluntarily to the Lac du
Flambeau reservation, about forty-five miles each way, to hold court at the tribal
court for the convenience of tribal members.” Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the
Aftermath of Teague: The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 177, 188-89 (2001).
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commentators have definitively rejected the beliefs of Beale and
other early choice-of-law theorists that a right is “created” when a
264
When a state court decides to
cause of action becomes complete.
apply state law, therefore, it chooses to do so by its own inherent
authority, not the tribe’s. Thus, in the absence of any preempting
federal dictate, states should be free to apply tribal law if they choose
to do so.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that a state court’s power to
apply any particular state’s law to the dispute before it is restricted
only by the modest limits imposed by the Due Process Clause. In the
265
key case on the subject, Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague, a
woman whose husband had been killed in a motorcycle accident sued
in Minnesota court seeking a declaration that her late husband’s
insurance policies could be “stacked” pursuant to Minnesota law,
while the insurer argued that Wisconsin law should govern the
266
question.
Although the insurance policy had been delivered in
Wisconsin, the accident had occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons
involved in the accident were Wisconsin residents when it occurred,
the Minnesota Supreme Court nonetheless determined that
267
Minnesota law should apply.
The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that the
Minnesota court’s decision satisfied the basic test the Due Process
clause imposed on state choice-of-law decisions—that the choice be
268
“neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”
This test, the Court
indicated, would be satisfied if the state whose law was applied had
any “significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with
269
the parties and the occurrence or transaction.”
As applied in
Hague, this requirement did not prove to be an onerous one. As the
Court noted, Hague had just three contacts in Minnesota: he worked

264. J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (1916), at 105 (“When a
right has been created by law, this right itself becomes a fact . . . . [a] right having
been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow
everywhere.”).
265. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
266. Id. at 305.
267. Id. at 306. The Minnesota Supreme Court followed Leflar’s approach,
placing particular weight on Leflar’s “better rule of law” factor—which the court
concluded in this case pointed in the direction of applying the Minnesota rule
permitting stacking. Id. at 306-07.
268. Id. at 320. The Court in fact considered the question under both the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause; the test, however, is identical
for both. See id. at 308 n.10. Because the Full Faith and Credit clause has not
generally been found to apply to tribes, this discussion considers the test only in
terms of the Due Process Clause.
269. Id.
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in Minnesota; Allstate did business in California; and Hague’s
widow had married a Minnesota resident and moved to Minnesota
272
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
prior to filing the lawsuit.
this slim collection of contacts—none of which was directly related to
the accident, and one of which arose well after the events at issue—
273
was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.
The Court
further observed that states have wide scope to choose which choiceof-law system to apply, noting that “a set of facts giving rise to a
lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one
274
jurisdiction.”
While Hague concerned a forum’s attempts to apply its own law, the
Court gave no indication that its holding was limited to application of
forum law. Thus, presumably Hague also sets the constitutional
boundaries for state-court application of tribal law. Hague would thus
appear to indicate that, so long as a litigant has contacts with the tribe
or his actions have some effect on it, there should be no
constitutional obstacle to the application of tribal law.
One objection to this analysis might be that, because of the more
limited nature of tribal sovereignty, a higher constitutional threshold
exists for the application of tribal law. The Court has, for example,
weighed concerns of procedural fairness in determining the extent of
275
tribes’ adjudicative jurisdiction.
Thus, it is possible that the
application of tribal law to nonmembers might raise special due
process concerns.
Yet while it is certainly true that the Supreme Court has not treated
tribes identically to states or other sovereigns, the Court has given no
indication that this distinction is relevant for choice-of-law purposes.
Indeed, the Court has occasionally suggested situations in which the
276
application of tribal law might be appropriate. Further, in matters
270. Hague also commuted to work in Minnesota, although the accident did not
occur during his commute. Id. at 314-15.
271. Id. at 317.
272. Id. at 318-19. While acknowledging that a post-accident move would be
“insufficient in and of itself” as a basis for the application of a given state’s law, the
Court nonetheless found that “such a change of residence was [not] irrelevant.” Id.
at 319.
273. See id. at 311 (finding that the contacts, although few, were “obviously
significant”).
274. Id. at 307.
275. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (suggesting that
nonmembers would be unduly burdened by having to defend a suit in an unfamiliar
tribal court); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978)
(expressing concerns about non-Indians being tried by all-Indian juries).
276. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng’g (“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986).
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involving the law of foreign nations, states have generally dealt with
conflicts of law in the manner that their usual policies dictate,
notwithstanding the fact that such choices may have broader
277
implications for foreign relations or other federal policies.
Thus,
even where a strong federal interest may be present, state courts have
normally been permitted to treat choice-of-law decisions as an
278
internal state matter. The same result, therefore, should also apply
in the tribal context. This is the result courts appear to have reached
in practice. Courts that have considered the peculiar attributes of
tribal sovereignty in deciding whether to apply tribal law have
ultimately concluded that tribes should be treated in the same
279
manner as other sovereigns.
Although application of tribal law by state courts thus seems
unlikely to raise constitutional questions in the vast majority of cases,
the question of whether state choice-of-law decisions might ever be
preempted by federal Indian-law principles is less certain. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed the relationship
between choice-of-law theory, with its territorial emphasis, and the
more uncertain boundaries of tribal jurisdiction sketched by
Montana. As detailed in the preceding discussion, the Court has
generally—though not universally—assumed that state courts will
apply state law, even though it has at other points suggested that state
courts might choose, or even be required, to apply tribal law.
Therefore, even though the way in which state courts resolve conflicts
between the law of other jurisdictions is ordinarily a matter of state
law, principles of federal Indian law might dictate different results
where tribal law is concerned. In other words, the Court’s statements
in Montana and successor cases about federal limitations on tribal
sovereignty might preempt a state court’s decision to treat a tribe on
277. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that state courts sometimes enforce
judgments “that conflict with American foreign policy or are based on foreign law
that differs substantially from American state or federal law”). Further, choice-of-law
principles do not generally differentiate between laws of foreign states and laws of
foreign nations. See Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement for the International Age, 75
IND. L.J. 575, 576-77 (2000) (the Second Restatement "postulates that these domestic
principles and rules apply to disputes involving foreign nations as well, because there
are no fundamental differences between interstate and international cases . . . .To
put it bluntly, from the Second Restatement's point of view, it does not matter
whether the choice is between the law of New York and New Hampshire or between
the law of New York and New Guinea.")
278. See id.; Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law:
Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165, 181
(noting that states determine whether foreign laws apply according to their internal
public policy, often ignoring federal interests).
279. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. App. 1977).
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an equal footing with other sovereigns. Under Montana, therefore,
state courts might be forbidden from applying tribal law at all, or, at a
minimum, from applying it to disputes that the tribe would not have
authority to regulate directly.
Such a conclusion, while tempting, would be incorrect. Cases such
as Strate, read carefully, do not explicitly provide that state law must
apply, or that tribal law may not apply, to nonmembers whose
281
conduct has an effect on the well-being of tribes.
It is clear from
Montana that tribes may not tax or regulate nonmembers’ use of their
282
private land except in special circumstances, and it is clear from
Strate that a tort claim against a nonmember may not be brought in
283
tribal court, at least if the tort did not occur on tribal trust land.
However, the Supreme Court has never held that, for example, a
tribal code provision imposing liability for negligent conduct on the
reservation should have no relevance of any kind to nonmembers.
On the contrary, the Court has recognized that tribes have some
stake in the conduct within their borders, even as it has held that this
interest is generally outweighed by nonmembers’ interest in not
284
being subject to the authority of tribal courts.
Even in the minority of states that possess jurisdiction over Indian
country pursuant to P.L. 280, a case can be made that no direct
federal barrier exists to the application of tribal law, at least in certain
circumstances, to tribal disputes brought in state court. This is true
notwithstanding the fact that the key case on the subject, Bryan v.
285
Itasca County, provides arguable support for the principle that state
courts hearing tribal disputes should, at least in P.L. 280 states, apply
286
state law. In Bryan, the Court considered the scope of civil authority
over Indian country in states that were granted jurisdiction pursuant
287
to P.L. 280. While Congress’s primary concern in enacting P.L. 280
had been to give states a role in punishing criminal conduct on
280. In Babbitt Ford, the court considered a version of this issue in deciding
whether to accord a tribe coequal sovereign status. Id. at 695.
281. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (reaffirming
reservation Indians’ inherent sovereign power over activities of nonmembers to the
extent necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations, but
claiming that authority over the state highway accident did not meet these criteria);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359-65 (2001).
282. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
283. 520 U.S. at 456-57.
284. See id. at 459. This is particularly true because the Court has refused to rule
out the possibility that tribal regulatory powers might exceed tribal adjudicative
powers.
285. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
286. The aftermath of 1950s assimilationist politics is reflected in this case. See
discussion supra Part I.A (examining assimilationist policies and tribal law generally).
287. 426 U.S. at 387-88.
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reservations, the statute also included hastily drafted civil jurisdiction
288
provisions. These provided that the participating states “shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which
Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country
listed . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action,” and further that the “civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
289
country as they have elsewhere within the State.”
Taking the position that this provision authorized the application
290
of state law within Indian country, Minnesota sought to collect
personal property tax from a Chippewa Tribe member living on the
291
reservation. The Bryan Court held that the state lacked authority to
292
do so. In what is generally hailed as an important victory for tribal
independence, the Supreme Court narrowly construed P.L. 280’s
somewhat cryptic civil jurisdiction provisions, holding that the
jurisdiction granted states was solely adjudicatory and did not permit
tribes to be “subordinated to the full panoply of [state] regulatory
293
powers.”
Instead, the Court found, the purpose of the civiljurisdiction provisions was simply to “redress the lack of adequate
Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation
Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by
294
permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes.”
Bryan’s central holding enabled tribes to preserve a core of distinct
regulatory authority even in P.L. 280 states. It has rightfully been
hailed as a masterly decision by a Court that wished to avoid giving
288. It is often believed that Congress’s primary impetus in passing P.L. 280 was to
give states a role in punishing criminal conduct on reservations and that the statute’s
civil jurisdiction provisions were something of an afterthought. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at
379 (citing Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541-42 (1975)).
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000).
290. The extent to which states can tax transactions by tribe members or otherwise
regulate conduct within Indian country is a complex issue in its own right. In
general, states do not lack all authority to regulate in Indian country, but their
powers are sharply limited. States generally do not have power to tax on-reservation
activity or to regulate the use of tribal lands, although they may have such authority
over nonmembers on fee lands within a reservation. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 26377. In P.L. 280 states, state prohibitory laws may apply in Indian country, but state
regulatory laws generally do not. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987).
291. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375.
292. Id. at 377 (determining that Itasca County was prohibited from levying
property taxes on Bryan’s home in the absence of congressional consent, and P.L.
280 did not provide the requisite consent).
293. Id. at 388.
294. Id. at 383.
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states wholesale authorization to regulate events within Indian
country while at the same time interpreting P.L. 280 in a way that its
295
Bryan’s more problematic aspect,
text could plausibly support.
however, is its assumption that state law would apply to state-court
proceedings involving Indians in P.L. 280 states. Although the Court
did not specifically discuss the issue, most commentators have
assumed that, under Bryan, state law can, and should, apply to
296
disputes brought pursuant to P.L. 280.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret Bryan as setting
forth a more general principle that state law should apply to tribal
matters in state court. It is first important to note that the Bryan
Court was dealing with a specific piece of legislation—one that does
not apply in many states, such as New Mexico, with a large number of
tribal disputes. Because of the sweeping language of P.L. 280, it is
hard to see how the Court could have interpreted P.L. 280 any more
narrowly than it did. P.L. 280 plainly gives state law, under some
circumstances, the same force and effect within Indian country as it
has in the state at large. By limiting such laws’ “force and effect” to
the adjudicative context, the Court ensured that state law would not
be generally applicable to tribes and that it would apply only when
tribal litigants, by bringing cases to state court, affirmatively elected
297
it. Ultimately, therefore, far from establishing a broad mandate for
the application of state law by state courts, the Court ensured that
P.L. 280’s commands would have the narrowest possible effect.
Given this, it is possible to interpret Bryan to allow the application
of tribal law under limited circumstances to tribal disputes even in
P.L. 280 states. Under Bryan, P.L. 280 could be interpreted to allow
states to apply their “whole law”—that is, in choice-of-law
terminology, their choice-of-law principles as well as their substantive
298
law. If states applied their usual choice-of-law principles to P.L. 280
295. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 429-32
(1993) (describing the Court’s artful construction of “one of the most assimilationist
laws in the history of federal Indian policy”).
296. CANBY, supra note 31, at 245; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (suggesting that, under P.L. 280, state law would
apply in private civil litigation). Note that even when plaintiffs assert state causes of
action, courts in P.L. 280 states may be required to engage issues of tribal law. See,
e.g., Turner v. Martire, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1054-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that plaintiffs could assert state-law tort claims against tribal officials against whom
plaintiff had asserted state-law tort claims were not immune because they had not
shown that they were acting within the scope of their official duties under tribal law).
297. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387-89.
298. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 725 (arguing that, in some cases, courts directed
to apply a state’s “whole law” might ultimately apply tribal law as a result of that
state’s choice-of-law principles).
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actions, such principles could ultimately dictate the application of
tribal law to the given action. Though Congress may not have
explicitly foreseen this result, it is difficult to argue that P.L. 280
expressly forbids it, given that state choice-of-law principles are as
299
much laws of “general application” as tort or contract law. Because
Bryan reaffirms tribes’ continuing regulatory jurisdiction over Indians
in Indian country, there is a particularly strong case that application
of tribal law in P.L. 280 states is permissible when such law is applied
to govern events and transactions that the tribe would have authority
to regulate, or to contracts in which the application of tribal law is a
300
negotiated term.
Thus, even when a case is brought pursuant to
P.L. 280 jurisdiction, the possibility of applying tribal law may not be
entirely foreclosed.
Of potential significance in this analysis is a little-interpreted
provision of P.L. 280 that provides that “Any tribal ordinance or
custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or
community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall,
if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given
full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action
301
pursuant to this section.” As commentators have noted, this section
is highly ambiguous; depending on whether “inconsistent” is given a
broad or a narrow interpretation, it may be either a broad mandate
for the application of tribal law to situations in which there is no state
law precisely on point, or a somewhat meaningless gesture of comity
302
with little practical effect. Nonetheless, the provision is couched in
mandatory language (“shall . . . be given full force and effect”) that
suggests, at the very least, that Congress intended that state courts
asserting P.L. 280 jurisdiction should be prepared to examine tribal
299. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (finding
that choice-of-law principles are substantive state law).
300. Notwithstanding the fact that Oregon is a P.L. 280 state, the court in Warm
Springs never cited P.L. 280 as a reason to apply state law to the tribal contract at
issue. The court also seemed to suggest that the parties to a contract could validly
elect to have tribal law apply under appropriate circumstances. See Warm Springs
Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. 1986).
301. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c).
302. Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian
Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and Federal
Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 1026-27 (2000), raises several important
questions about the meaning of this term, asking, “Is it enough that a tribal law is
inconsistent with the public policy behind the state's law? Or if the law of the two
sovereigns are only partially inconsistent, must the court apply the portion of tribal
law that is not inconsistent? And it is not clear whether the state court has an
affirmative duty to discover the tribal law or whether the burden is on the parties to
inform the court of the tribal law.” See also Canby, supra note 31, at 245 (noting that
since “most states have relatively complete bodies of civil law,” this provision “did not
leave much room for tribal law to operate”).
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sources of law. This provision, therefore, supports an argument that,
under appropriate circumstances, it is appropriate for courts in P.L.
280 states to examine tribal law under state choice-of-law principles.
B. Application of Tribal Law and Federal Principles of Tribal Autonomy
While the Montana line of cases has been aimed at shielding
nonmembers from unwanted assertions of tribal jurisdiction,
Supreme Court case law has also had another, arguably more
important goal: protecting the rights of tribes against states. Thus, as
Williams and Fisher indicate, some matters implicating tribes are
303
simply inappropriate for adjudication in state court.
Could the
same be true, under any circumstances, with regard to state court
decisions to apply tribal law? In other words, is it possible that the
application of tribal law might, in some cases, be preempted under
federal Indian law on the grounds that it conflicts with tribal
sovereignty?
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that the application of state
law to events that concern tribe members or that take place on
reservation always interferes, to a greater or lesser extent, with both
of Williams’ imperatives—that is, that tribes be permitted both to
“make” their own laws and to “be ruled by” them. Because the court
can make a binding decision affecting the tribe in which the tribe has
no say, the process of adjudication interferes with tribes’ ability to
“make” their own laws. Moreover, when state law is applied to
reservation matters, it also interferes with tribes’ ability to “be ruled
by” the laws they make, because a sovereign other than the tribe
determines the law that will govern tribe members’ conduct.
The equation becomes more complicated, however, when a dispute
is heard in state court but tribal law applies. It is certainly true that in
some cases the application of tribal law by a state rather than a tribal
court has the potential to undermine the principles announced in
Williams. Where a given tribe’s judicial values are fundamentally
incompatible with state-court adjudication—as may be the case, for
example, with tribes using nonadversarial dispute resolution
processes—allowing a state court to hear a case may inevitably distort
and dilute tribal law, interfering with tribes’ right to make law in the

303. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (determining that state courts were
not free to exercise jurisdiction over a civil action by a non-Indian against an Indian
over a cause of action arising on an Indian reservation); Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (restricting jurisdiction of state courts over disputes between
Indians, absent a governing act of Congress, to state actions that do not infringe on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them).
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manner they might wish. Similarly, where a tribal forum is available
but a case is brought in state court, the effect of allowing the state
court to apply tribal law may be to undermine the tribal court’s
authority. In such situations, allowing a state rather than a tribal
court to apply tribal law is certainly in tension, if not outright conflict,
with the underlying principles of Williams.
This line of reasoning, however, rests on the broad assumption that
a tribal forum is both available and a viable alternative to state court.
As has been discussed, however, many cases exist in which a tribe has
legitimate interests in the outcome of a case, but a state court is, for
jurisdictional or practical reasons, the only forum in which the
304
dispute can be heard.
In such cases, application of tribal law in
state court actually promotes tribes’ right to “be ruled by” the laws they
make, by allowing tribes to expand their sphere of influence and
ensure that tribal standards of conduct are applied to events that
might affect them. In other words, where a tribal forum is not readily
available, the application of tribal law should not be seen as usurping
the role of the tribal court, but instead as displacing state law that
would otherwise apply. Because application of state law to tribal
matters rarely furthers tribal self-rule, application of tribal law in such
circumstances is in keeping with Williams’ broad principles.
Thus, a more productive way of looking at Williams may be as a case
that is relevant to decisions about which law should apply to a case
rather than exclusively to decisions about which forum should hear it.
That is, once state-court jurisdiction is already established, either
because the Supreme Court has mandated it or an Indian litigant has
chosen it, the reasoning of Williams should weigh in favor of, not
305
against, the application of tribal law. Such an interpretation would
address Williams’ key concerns—ensuring that tribal law is applied to
tribal matters and that Indian defendants are not required to appear
in state court against their will. Yet it would also acknowledge the

304. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
305. A more radical re-understanding of Williams might be to view it exclusively as a
choice-of-law case mandating that tribal law apply to reservation-centered
transactions. In other words, as long as the tribal defendant does not object to
adjudication in state court, state adjudication would be permissible so long as tribal
law applies. Under such a reading, Williams could also be understood as giving
Indian defendants (or, perhaps, the tribe itself) a power of removal to tribal court if
one were available. Since Williams remains one of the few affirmations of tribal
sovereignty that is still good law, any revision of its holding carries some danger to
tribes. This approach would, however, acknowledge the reality that some state courts
have pushed the limits of what Williams allows—by, for example, deciding claims by
and against tribe members so long as some relevant conduct took place off the
reservation. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 549.
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reality that many cases with tribal contacts are heard by state courts,
and that the tribe has a continuing stake in those cases.
A subtler problem in applying tribal law in state court involves the
implication of precedents that the Court has developed in the federal
court context. As the previous section has discussed, the Court has
generally assumed that state and tribal courts operate in separate
spheres and will apply separate law, while also acknowledging that,
under certain circumstances, state and tribal courts might have
concurrent jurisdiction over the same case. The Court has given state
courts little guidance in how to negotiate areas of overlapping
jurisdiction with tribal courts—what to do, for example, if a litigant
files suit in tribal court and then proceeds to file another suit, arising
306
out of the same facts, in state court.
Nonetheless, in cases where the jurisdiction of tribal and federal
court arguably overlaps, the Court has held that where arguable
tribal-court jurisdiction exists, a plaintiff can sue in state court only
after pursuing tribal remedies, including any possible appeals.
Although the extent of tribal jurisdiction is a question of federal law,
307
the Court held in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
that tribal courts must have the opportunity to determine their own
jurisdiction first; only after a final pronouncement from the tribal
courts may federal courts engage in a final level of review to
308
determine whether the tribal exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
309
In LaPlante, the Court clarified that the exhaustion principle
extended even to cases in which federal jurisdiction was founded in
diversity. In such cases, the court found, “unconditional access to the
federal forum would place it in direct competition with the tribal
courts, thereby impairing the latter’s authority over reservation
310
affairs.”
Further, the Court observed, “[a]djudication of such
matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law-making
authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and
311
apply tribal law.”
Various state court cases have considered the implications of Crow
312
Tribe and LaPlante for concurrent state/tribal jurisdiction.
State
306. This situation is most likely to arise in P.L. 280 states.
307. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
308. Id. at 857.
309. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
310. Id. at 16.
311. Id.
312. In a particularly lengthy and scholarly opinion, the Connecticut Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that state adjudication is permissible in the absence of
a pending action in the tribal court. See Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 64 (Conn.
1998).
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courts have differed on whether Crow Tribe and LaPlante require state
court abstention where states and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction
313
On the one hand, LaPlante makes clear that tribal
over a case.
courts are to be the primary expositors of tribal law, and that
adjudication by nontribal courts to some extent always impinges on
314
tribal sovereignty.
On the other hand, LaPlante does not speak at
all to the issue of state jurisdiction, and other Supreme Court cases,
from Bryan to Wold, contemplate the exercise of concurrent state
jurisdiction under certain circumstances without articulating an
315
equivalent exhaustion principle.
In considering the issue, it is important to note, first, that Crow
Tribe and LaPlante both dealt with a situation in which a suit was
already pending in tribal court and the tribal court’s jurisdiction was
316
thus directly challenged.
Although the holding of these cases was
not limited to that situation, some courts have concluded that comitybased concerns about interference with another sovereign’s
proceedings are less compelling when no tribal suit has yet been
filed—even in situations where the tribal court might hypothetically
317
have jurisdiction over the case.
In such cases, state-court
adjudication might indirectly undermine the power of tribal courts to
pronounce on reservation affairs, but it does not operate as a direct
attempt to strip the tribal court of its authority. While the underlying
principles of LaPlante counsel caution in any case where concurrent
tribal jurisdiction exists, an argument can be made that a state court
should, in limited circumstances, have discretion to hear such cases—
if, for example, the state forum is strongly preferred by an Indian
plaintiff.
An even stronger argument can be made that a case in which a
state court has exclusive jurisdiction should be regarded differently
from one in which it is exercising concurrent jurisdiction—and thus
potentially competing with tribal courts. Indeed, if a tribal court is
not available or clearly lacks jurisdiction over a case, the exhaustion
principle of Crow Tribe and LaPlante cannot apply literally—since there
is, in effect, nothing to exhaust. In this regard, it is worth noting that

313. See id. at 64 nn.16-17 (listing cases that conclude that exhaustion of tribal
remedies is necessary either (1) only in the absence of a pending tribal proceeding,
or (2) regardless of whether an action is pending in tribal court).
314. See supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 303-305 and accompanying text.
316. See Drumm, 716 A.2d at 64 (noting that in both Crow Tribe and LaPlante, the
two Supreme Court cases holding exhaustion was necessary, a tribal court
proceeding was already pending).
317. See id. at 64-65.
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the Supreme Court has retreated from much of the reasoning on
318
The Supreme Court’s recent case law has
which LaPlante rested.
not only narrowed the scope of tribal jurisdiction, but ensured that
tribal and state jurisdiction will remain closely linked in a way that
tribal and federal jurisdiction are not. As Strate makes clear, state
courts have a role to play in adjudicating tribal disputes, picking up
where tribal jurisdiction ends to provide a forum in which tribe
319
members’ claims against nonmembers can be heard.
As the Court has limited tribal courts’ power to adjudicate cases
involving nonmembers, it has become virtually inevitable that many
cases with substantial tribal contacts will be heard in state court.
Thus, the main objective of LaPlante—to ensure that tribal courts
have the primary role in interpreting tribal law—is no longer
achievable except at the cost of expanding state law’s applicability to
320
tribal matters.
321
Attempts to honor the underlying principles of LaPlante must
thus take into account the reality that, in many cases, tribal law must
be applied in state court or not at all. Therefore, while LaPlante
remains an important guidepost for state courts addressing tribal-law
issues, it should not operate to bar state court consideration of tribal
law completely.
C. Tribal Law and Tribal Interests
The fact that Supreme Court precedent does not broadly prohibit
the application of tribal law by state courts does not mean that such a
practice is always in the best interests of tribes. Many tribes and
318. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 566 (examining the Court’s retreat from the
reasoning in LaPlante).
319. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
320. Many Indian law scholars have sharply criticized the Supreme Court’s postMontana case law as unduly restricting tribal sovereignty in ways that lack historical or
textual basis—a position with which the Author of this Article is sympathetic. See,
e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture
of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). Defenders of the
post-Montana state of affairs, however, might counter that Montana serves the
important function of protecting the settled expectations and due process rights of
nonmembers. Whatever the merits of Montana, however, its holding is likely here to
stay. In fact, the Court has recently expanded Montana’s reach. It is important to
emphasize, therefore, that both detractors and supporters of Montana can potentially
approve of wider state-court application of tribal law. Those who dislike Montana can
embrace this outcome as a means of restoring some of the tribal influence Montana
stripped away; supporters should find it unobjectionable because such adjudication
would take place in a forum bound (as tribal courts are not) to respect nonmember
litigants’ constitutional rights.
321. The LaPlante Court did not acknowledge that tribal civil jurisdiction was not
subject to Oliphant, and thus not as restricted as tribal criminal jurisdiction. 480 U.S.
9, 15 (1987).
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advocates for tribal rights have been skeptical about application of
tribal law outside tribal forums and uneasy about the capacity of
outsider courts to understand Indian cultural norms. In fact, some
commentators have argued that application of tribal law outside
tribal courts poses such grave threats to tribal sovereignty and
practical problems of proof that state courts should follow a “brightline rule” of dismissing cases whenever their choice-of-law principles
322
point toward tribal substantive law.
There are legitimate reasons for skepticism about the value to
tribes of having their law applied in state courts. Commentators have
worried, first, that state-court adjudication of tribal disputes would
323
weaken the power of tribal courts.
Maintaining a distinctively
Indian judiciary is important because it allows a tribe’s traditional
methods of decision-making to survive. Some tribal court systems,
such as that of the Cherokee Nation, may be centuries old; such
324
courts are generally an integral part of tribal life. Even if the tribe
325
adopts some Anglo traditions or procedures, tribal court is a place
where the tribe asserts its sovereignty by making and enforcing its
laws and customs. State court application of tribal law may interfere
with these benefits by undermining the work of tribal courts.
Further, tribal and state courts are to some extent in competition for
litigants and resources. If state courts are permitted to apply tribal
law, such courts may become even more attractive alternatives, luring
some plaintiffs away from tribal court.

322. See Harte, supra note 13, at 95 (arguing that “[t]ribal courts, and tribal courts
alone, should interpret tribal law,” since only tribal courts are equipped to make
decisions regarding the extent of “what is necessary to protect tribal self-government”
under the standard announced in Montana). Further, Harte argues, application of
tribal law in state court may present insurmountable practical problems: state and
tribal courts have significant value differences, and tribal law may be difficult or
impossible to prove, especially since those most familiar with it are tribal elders who
“may not speak English or may not be permitted to divulge important tribal ideals in
an open and alien state courtroom.” Id. at 92. Harte acknowledges one danger of
his approach: that, rather than dismissing a case, state courts will manipulate their
choice-of-law principles in order to find that forum law, rather than tribal law,
applies. Id. at 99.
323. Id. at 92 (arguing that application of tribal laws in the state adversarial system
would undermine the authority of the tribal court system).
324. The courts of the Cherokee Nation claim roots in tribal dispute-resolution
processes dating back to the 1600s. The tribe has maintained a formal court system
intermittently since at least 1839. See Leeds, supra note 33, at 317-19; Cherokee
Nation: Judicial Branch, available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=
government&branch=judicial.
325. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225, 250-55 (1994), for a discussion of ways in which tribal courts integrate
traditional and Anglo-American practices.
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State courts can also hinder the work of tribal judiciaries in a more
basic way—by failing to get the law right, or by failing to understand
the cultural and procedural background that may be integral to the
law’s application.
This is a particular problem because
interpretations of tribal law in state court are unlikely to be subject to
326
Sometimes state courts may be
any further level of review.
327
overwhelmed by the sheer unfamiliarity of tribal law, but judges
may be also become confused when state and tribal laws superficially
resemble each other. Gloria Valencia-Weber, for example, has noted
that the frequently used tribal tort standard of “carelessness” is subtly
different from the state-law standard of “negligence” and that
328
nontribal courts may blur the distinction. Because of the potential
for this sort of misunderstanding, both Indians and non-Indians
affected by tribal-law issues may prefer to have tribal law applied by a
judge who knows it well.
While these dangers are real, however, they fail to tell the whole
story. To begin with, as commercially significant off-reservation
dealings by tribes and individual Indians become increasingly
routine, some growth in the proportion of cases implicating tribal
329
interests heard in state court is inevitable.
In fact, under some
circumstances, cases against non-Indians are funneled to state courts
by tribal design; some tribal codes do not provide for jurisdiction
over non-Indians who do not consent to have disputes litigated there,
meaning that Indian plaintiffs who wish to sue non-Indians must go
330
to state court. The problem may be even worse in P.L. 280 states,
since one effect of P.L. 280 has been to impede the development of
331
tribal judicial systems in affected states. Tribal litigants in P.L. 280
states, therefore, may find that no tribal forum is available to hear
326. Harte, supra note 13, at 98.
327. Complicated issues of establishing the content of tribal law arose, for
example, in John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 2001), and People by Abrams v. Anderson,
529 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
328. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 325, at 255-56 (comparing “carelessness” to
“negligence” and noting that, among other differences, “carelessness” does not
require a detailed analysis of elements such as duty and standard of care).
329. As tribes and individual Indians enter into more commercial transactions off
the reservation and exclusively on-reservation transactions become less frequent and
less important, off-reservation transactions will be of greater importance to the tribes.
Despite the obvious tribal interests in these transactions, any disputes arising from
off-reservation contacts will often be under the jurisdiction of the state court.
Reynolds, supra note 7, at 559.
330. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 213 (noting that some tribes assert jurisdiction
only over tribal defendants). Given the uncertain and shifting boundaries of tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers, it is understandable that many tribes might prefer to
err on the side of simplicity and caution.
331. See Vanessa J. Jiminez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent State and Tribal Jurisdiction
under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1636-37 (1998).
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332

their case. Where state courts essentially have exclusive jurisdiction
by default, concerns about competition with tribal courts are largely
inapplicable.
In such circumstances, state-court application of tribal law can
allow tribes to have some voice in a wider array of cases. As Laurie
Reynolds has argued, neither tribes or tribal courts will benefit by the
principle that “state courts may freely ignore tribal interests in any
333
dispute displaying off-reservation contacts.” As the sphere in which
tribes can directly assert power over nonmembers has diminished,
some tribes have come to reject the absolutist ideal of sovereign
autonomy—what Robert Laurence has wryly described as “the
334
increasingly unfettered power to do less and less.”
Basically, for
some tribes, the exclusive right to have tribal laws interpreted in
tribal court may be less important than the ability to exert influence
over transactions that affect tribal lands and communities—a goal
that may be best accomplished by allowing state and federal courts to
apply tribal law.
In addition to such lesser-of-two-evils rationales for applying tribal
law, there may be more affirmative benefits to tribes. Application of
tribal law may foster a greater sense of cooperation between tribal
and state courts, permitting state courts a basic understanding of
tribal procedures that may help reduce suspicion and
miscommunication when the state court is asked to grant full faith
and credit to tribal judgments or stay its proceedings in favor of a
related suit in tribal court. Such cooperation is likely to become
increasingly important as tribes’ economic well-being becomes more
and more dependent on finding fair and efficient ways to resolve
cases that span reservation boundaries. When multimillion-dollar
disputes arise between tribal corporations and their contracting
partners—as is increasingly likely in the age of tribal gaming—both
parties’ interests are served when the judicial system as a whole is able
to minimize opportunities for forum-shopping and inconsistent
335
results.
332. See Thorington, supra note 302, at 1035 (discussing problems that can arise
when no tribal forum exists).
333. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 559.
334. Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated
Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation
Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979, 981 (1995). See J.R. Mueller, Restoring Harmony
through Nalyeeh: Can the Navajo Common Law of Torts be Applied in State and Federal
Forums?, 2 TRIBAL L.J. 3 (2001-2002), for a discussion of this shift in attitude among
some tribes and arguments advocating the increased application of Navajo tort-law
principles in nontribal forums.
335. See Thorington, supra note 302, at 1032 (discussing the confusion and
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It is also important to note that it is far from impossible for state
courts to apply tribal law carefully and accurately. Although certain
elements of tribal law may be as arcane and complex as state courts
have sometimes feared, disputes that find their way into state court
are more likely to involve principles of tribal tort and commercial law
336
than complicated matters of internal tribal relations. In such cases,
while the applicable tribal law may not mirror exactly the law of any
given state, it is likely to present the sort of conflicts with which state
courts are familiar—issues such as what damages are available to a
337
plaintiff, whether a judicial process must precede repossession of
338
339
property, or whether an oral contract modification is enforceable.
Moreover, even when the legal issues involved are less
straightforward, finding and establishing the content of tribal law in
state court need not be complicated. State reforms in recent years
have made establishing the content of foreign law easier in general
by, for example, allowing courts to take judicial notice of such law
340
rather than requiring it to be proven.
In addition, the court
systems of many larger tribes are increasingly well-financed and wellestablished, often with extensive, Web-searchable libraries of
341
decisions or equivalent resources.
Further, the legitimate concerns about application of tribal law in
state court might be better addressed by developing strategies to
funnel certain cases and issues into tribal court, rather than banning
state-court application of tribal law entirely. State courts can, for
example, give tribal courts preference in deciding tribal disputes,
while remaining willing to apply tribal law where the tribal court is
inconvenient or unavailable. Courts can also develop procedural
opportunity for forum-shopping that results from the inconsistent application of
tribal law).
336. This is likely to be the case because the jurisdiction of state courts over
internal tribal matters is sharply limited. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
382, 386 (1976); see also Cohen, supra note 24, § 6.04[3][b], at 554-55 (noting that
state courts exercising jurisdiction under P.L. 280 have declined jurisdiction over
internal tribal disputes such as elections).
337. Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302-05 (D.N.M. 1999).
338. Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 68-69 (N.M. 2003).
339. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d
740, 741 (Or. 1986).
340. See, e.g., id. at 742-43 (discussing wider availability of judicial notice for
foreign law); Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, Art. IV
(authorizing courts, in determining the content of foreign law, to “consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party
or admissible under the rules of evidence”).
341. For example, the National Tribal Justice Resource Center maintains a
searchable database of codes, constitutions, by-laws, and judicial opinions from more
than fifty tribes. See Tribal Justice Resource Center, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org.
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mechanisms to facilitate consideration of tribal-law issues in state
court while insuring that states do not infringe on tribal autonomy.
For example, many commentators have advocated increased use of
342
certification procedures for tribal-law questions.
A few tribes
already have enacted laws permitting state and federal judges to
343
certify questions to their courts, and some nontribal courts have
entertained plaintiffs’ requests to certify issues of tribal law to tribal
344
courts.
In the tribal law setting, certification presents an ideal
opportunity for state courts to become familiar with tribal decisionmaking processes in a neutral, mutually respectful context.
Certification would be particularly useful in situations where tribal
substantive law is closely intertwined with procedure; in such cases,
tribes could preserve the integrity of traditional decision-making
processes while retaining influence in the outcome of state-court
cases.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens or other discretionary
abstention doctrines may also be useful for achieving similar ends in
cases where a tribal forum is available to hear a case initially brought
345
in state court.
A finding of forum non conveniens allows a court to
discretionarily dismiss a case when the forum of a different
jurisdiction is better situated—for both practical and cultural
reasons—to hear it. In international contexts, courts consider several
central factors in deciding whether to dismiss the case on the ground
of forum non conveniens, including issues pertaining to the private
interests of the litigants, such as ease of access to sources of proof, the
cost of obtaining witnesses, and other practical issues, as well as
public factors such as the avoidance of the application of foreign law
and the interest in “having localized controversies decided at
346
home.”
Many of these factors will often be present in the Indianlaw context as well because the state court may be distant
geographically from tribal occurrences and may be wholly unfamiliar
with tribal law, and parties may find it difficult to bring witnesses to a
sometimes-distant state court.

342. See Tebben, supra note 263, at 185.
343. See Pommersheim, supra note 342, at 168 n.172 (citing Mille Lacs Band Stat.
Ann. tit. 24, § 3001 (1996), which uses language similar to section 3 of the widely
enacted state Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, and Hopi Tribal Code
§ 1.2.8 (1992)).
344. See Bryant ex rel. Bryant v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956-57 (D. Ariz.
2000) (considering request for certification of questions of Navajo law to the Navajo
Supreme Court, but ultimately concluding that tribal law did not apply to the case).
345. See generally Harte, supra note 13.
346. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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Because forum non conveniens allows courts to consider a variety of
factors particular to the individual case, it provides a great deal of
flexibility to individual judges. Further, since forum non conveniens
determinations are often made contingent on the availability of an
347
alternative forum, the doctrine also allows state courts to permit
tribal courts a first chance to consider difficult issues of tribal law
while retaining the prerogative to hear the case if no tribal forum
proves to be available.
Finally, the choice-of-law process itself affords opportunities for
states to take tribal interests into consideration. Tribes that value
internal decision-making procedures, fear competition from state
courts, or worry about distortion of tribal law in the hands of
outsiders can adopt a formal policy opposing state-court application
of their law. Tribes could also, of course, sanction the application of
certain areas of tribal law (commercial law, for example) by state
courts, while specifying that other aspects of tribal law (such as those
touching on family relations) are matters of internal tribal relations
to be decided by the tribe alone. Because most choice-of-law regimes
allow state courts to take public policy issues into account when
348
deciding which sovereign’s law to apply, state courts would be able
to consider the preferences of tribes when deciding whether or not to
apply tribal law. State courts would also have an additional incentive
to avoid the application of tribal law when it is contrary to the tribe’s
preference, since there is a greater danger that such a practice would
violate the tribe’s right to “make [its] own laws and to be ruled by
them,” hence running afoul of the central principle of Williams.
As a last note, any argument that state application of tribal law will
lead to conflict or misunderstanding must grapple with the fact that
many state courts have already committed themselves to a process of
interpreting tribal law in an area in which issues of cross-cultural
understanding are likely to prove far more problematic. Many state
courts refuse to give automatic full faith and credit to tribal
349
judgments. Instead, procedures in the majority of states dictate that
state courts must examine tribal judgments for fairness and
procedural regularity before deciding whether or not to enforce
them. To take a representative statute, Wisconsin allows state courts
to examine tribal judgments based on a number of criteria, including
347. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991).
348. See id. at 16; cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing public policy
considerations in context of enforcing foreign rulings and decrees).
349. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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whether they were “procured in compliance with procedures
350
required by the rendering court.”
Ironically, such requirements often require state courts to examine
tribal law far more extensively than would be necessary if they were to
apply directly a substantive point of tribal law. Suppose, for example,
that the party resisting enforcement of a tribal judgment contends
that the tribal judge violated standards of due process by applying a
351
tribal ordinance inconsistently in his case.
In order to assess the
validity of that claim, the court must have at least a general
understanding of the content of that ordinance and the procedures
by which it is normally applied. The court must also be able to review
the tribal proceedings in the individual case to determine whether
the tribal court applied those procedures in a fashion inconsistent
with usual practice. Making such determinations on a reasonably
principled basis, therefore, may require the court to immerse itself
thoroughly in the details of tribal law.
By contrast, where state conflict-of-law principles dictate the
352
application of tribal law, the issues are likely to be less complex. By
definition, tribal issues that appear in state court virtually always
involve a mix of on-reservation and off-reservation contacts. Where
tribal law on the subject exists, therefore, it is often law that the tribe
350. WIS. STAT. § 806.245(4)(e) (1994).
351. This brief discussion does not even consider the question of whether AngloAmerican notions of due process should necessarily be applied as a standard by
which to measure proceedings in tribal courts. Many tribes adhere to cultural
principles that are, in fact, inconsistent with those notions. Some tribal judicial
systems, for example, may emphasize repairing relationships among the parties
rather than determining winners and losers. Guided by such principles, certain
tribes may see little problem with, for example, the existence of personal ties
between the judge and one or both parties—even though this situation would
certainly offend Anglo-American due process norms. For an example of how tribes
may embrace different models of due process, see John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska
2001).
352. There are, of course, exceptions. In People by Abrams v. Anderson, 137 A.D.2d
259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), for example, a New York State court exercised jurisdiction
over an intratribal dispute pursuant to a unique federal provision, 25 U.S.C. §§ 232233, which grants New York courts jurisdiction over “civil actions and proceedings
between Indians.” The case arose out of a bitter intratribal dispute about a bingo
hall operated by an unincorporated association of tribal members. Id. at 262. The
bingo hall’s operators argued that it was authorized by tribal custom; the tribe’s
Council of Chiefs, however, argued that the hall was illegal under an 1885 tribal law
prohibiting gambling. Id. The dispute ultimately descended into violence and
chaos, and it seems unlikely that the New York courts’ ultimate resolution of the
case—which supported the bingo hall operators despite the fact that the federal
government recognized the Council of Chiefs as the tribes’ governing authority and
supported their position that the bingo hall was illegal—did much to restore tribal
harmony. Because Abrams involved a hotly contested and wholly internal tribal
dispute, there is a strong case that the state courts should have dismissed it (or
attempted to refer it to some form of tribal resolution) on public policy grounds.
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has enacted in the knowledge that it may be applied to dealings with
nonmembers. For that very reason, it may be more closely tailored to
off-reservation situations and more easily translated into Anglo
norms. It is notable that most of the cases discussed in this Article do
not involve fundamental cultural clashes, but more mundane and
familiar tort, contract, and property disputes between individual
353
litigants.
Relative to the complicated procedural matters that state
courts often encounter in the full faith and credit context, these
issues are likely to be relatively straightforward.
CONCLUSION
A place exists for tribal law in state courts. Even allowing for the
unusual features of tribal sovereignty, state choice-of-law principles,
applied neutrally and consistently, should frequently point to tribal
law as the decisional law in many cases. The Supreme Court’s
decision to treat the problem of cases with mixed state and tribal
contacts as solely a question of jurisdiction and forum choice has
obscured the potential a choice-of-law approach offers to advance the
interests of tribes and resolve the procedural dilemmas of litigants.
As long as proper safeguards are in place, state courts should be
encouraged to analyze cases involving tribal contacts in choice-of-law
terms.

353. See section II.B.3 supra (describing several examples of state courts’
experiences with cases implicating tribal law.

